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A Human Systems Integration (HSI) analysis of the Army Suicide Prevention Program 
(ASPP) was conducted to gain feedback from soldiers and leaders.  The scope of this 
study limited analysis to the prevention activities associated with the ASPP system.  A 
retrospective analysis of Army suicide statistics from 2008–2011 was conducted prior to 
data collection.  During 24 in-person interviews, soldiers assessed the importance of the 
four user needs, the usefulness of the system’s interfaces, and overall effectiveness of the 
system. 
The research team drew conclusions about two of the four research questions.  
The study determined there were mismatches between the needs of the users and the 
system resources and concluded the stigma associated with seeking help is a hindrance to 
help-seeking behaviors.  The system mismatches were translated into four system gaps 
and eight recommendations.  The diversity and feedback of the participants was 
noteworthy and provided vital insight into the suicide issue within the military and the 
Army’s effort to address the problem.  Recommendations for future research are: 
including poor sleep quality as a risk factor for suicide, including self-awareness as a 
protective factor for suicide, implementing more evidence-based approaches to care, and 
leveraging lessons learned from college-based suicide prevention. 
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This research viewed the Army Suicide Prevention Program (ASPP) as a complex system 
and analyzed its effectiveness with respect to Human Systems Integration (HSI).  The 
focus of this effort was to gain feedback from the end users’ perspective.  The study 
presents overall system findings, draws conclusions about the system gaps, and makes 
recommendations for improving the program.  The four research questions were: 1) Is 
there is a mismatch between the resources offered by the ASPP system and the needs of 
the soldiers who use the system? 2) Does the assessment of the ASPP system vary 
between those who have previous experience with suicide and those who do not? 3) Is 
there a difference in system assessments between soldiers of different genders and rank 
categories? 4) Does the stigma associated with help-seeking behavior contribute to risk-
taking behavior? 
This study combined a retrospective analysis of previous years’ suicide statistics 
and semi-structured interviews with current system users assigned to an Army division.  
Installation and unit leaders provided background information on the unit’s Suicide 
Prevention (SP) program and 24 soldiers participated in the interviews.  The analysis 
conducted was qualitative, using the comparison of the frequency and distribution of 
interview and survey answers based on the participant demographic information.  
The research team could only draw conclusions about the first and fourth research 
questions.  First, the study determined there were mismatches between the needs of the 
users and the system resources, which were translated into four system gaps: 1) Training 
focus and format imbalances, 2) Buddy care limitations, 3) Persistence of the stigma 
associated with seeking help, and 4) Users’ limited awareness of SP resources available.  
Each gap was further analyzed to determine the applicability of each HSI domain defined 
by the Army MANPRINT Directorate.  All HSI domains were applicable to the first and 
fourth gaps, while four domains were applicable to the second and third gaps.  Second, 
there was overwhelming support for the prediction that the stigma associated with 
seeking help for suicide impedes system use.  Due to the small sample size and  
 
xviii 
answer distribution, this study did not find a significant difference between the 
assessments of those with different ranks, genders, and experiences with suicide.   
Participants translated their experiences with the ASPP system into 8 
recommendations for improvements: 1) Increase focus on protective factors and engaged 
leadership during training and strategic communications, 2) Reinforce the Army team 
concept, 3) Decrease stigma by increasing confidentiality and improving follow-up, 4) 
Improve strategic communications on resources available and steps to take when 
providing assistance, 5) Improve collaboration on and effectiveness of prevention efforts, 
6) Eliminate a mandated Stand Down day, 7) Couple SP with Resilience training when 
appropriate, and 8) Make ASIST and MRT certification more effective and relevant.  
Three necessities were reiterated at all levels throughout this analysis as key to the 
success of the system: engaged leadership reinforced with confidentiality and trust, 
increased protective factors using self- and buddy care, and an operating environment 
that relies on the aforementioned to eliminate the perpetuation of a stigma. The 
installation and unit leaders interviewed strive to be innovative in their approach to get 
ahead of the suicide issue in their formations. Participants generally made positive 
assessments of the attention the Army has given to SP. 
With the goal of HSI being optimization of total system performance, this study 
noted how improvements in feedback, collaboration, and system interfaces could bridge 
the gaps between the users and the system.  The completion of an Army SP needs 
assessment, continued discussion on the military perspective of suicide and SP, and 
improvements to the ASPP Website were additional recommendations.  It goes without 
saying that a larger sample size would be needed for a more quantitative analysis, 
however the value of this qualitative approach cannot be minimized.  The diversity of the 
feedback given during the interviews was noteworthy. Ten participants shared their 
experiences with suicidal soldiers, further reiterating the timeliness of this research. 
Recommendations for future research are: including poor sleep quality as a risk factor for 
suicide, including self-awareness as a protective factor for suicide, implementing 
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This research views the Army Suicide Prevention Program (ASPP) as a complex 
system and analyzes its effectiveness from the users’ perspective.  The study presents 
findings with respect to Human Systems Integration (HSI), draws conclusions about the 
gaps within the ASPP, and makes recommendations for improving the program. 
Continuous efforts to drive down the number of completed suicides in the military 
must include enhancing the total performance of the ASPP system.  As a part of this 
effort, this thesis assesses what works within the program and what does not, from the 
perspective of system users.  When system structure does not maximize human-system 
interaction, recommendations are made on how to customize the program to better fit the 
needs of the users. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Suicides in the Army showed a record increase in 2008.  In that year, the 
Department of Defense (DoD) reported a 50 percent increase in active duty suicides from 
10.3 per 100,000 in 2001 to 15.8 for every 100,000 (James, 2012).  In Figure 1, Black, 
Gallaway, Bell, and Ritchie (2011) demonstrate the Army’s suicide rate went from 
declining from 1990 to 2004, to showing increases during the outsets of Operations 
Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, to exceeding the rates adjusted for age and race in 
the civilian population in 2008.  These numbers have since continued to climb and have 
raised our nation’s awareness of the prevalence of suicide in the military.   
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Figure 1.  U.S. Suicide Rates from 1990—2009: Army versus Civilian  
(Adjusted for Age and Gender) (From Black et al., 2011)  
The Army has devoted massive resources to analyzing the medical and 
psychological data gathered from soldiers during the last decade of continuous conflict.  
Appendix C provides some of the statistics on suicide risk factors drawn from this type of 
research on Soldiers from 2001—2009, as presented by Black et al.  This type of analysis 
has helped provide a better understanding of how combat stress has impacted the human 
dimension of the force.  Suicidality exists in a “multifactorial nature, which has required 
the adoption of a compound approach to intervention, combining population-based 
screening and education with more targeted efforts for those at above-baseline risk” 
(Bagley, Munjas, & Shekelle, 2010, p. 258).  The ASPP system incorporates military 
psychology concepts into the design and delivery of resources that aim to decrease 
suicidal behavior.  Figure 2 presents the public health and preventive medicine view of 




Figure 2.  The Army Suicide Prevention Model (From American Association  
of Suicidology & U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion  
and Preventive Medicine, n.d., p. 33)  
The Army produced two reports with the results of ongoing studies on Health 
Promotion/Risk Reduction/Suicide Prevention (HP/RR/SP).  In the 2010 report, more 
commonly known as the Army Red Book, Chiarelli noted, “We have a tremendous 
influence on increasing help-seeking behavior, reducing high risk behavior and, 
ultimately, on reducing our unacceptable casualty rates” (U.S. Army, 2009, p. ii).  The 
Army Red Book was the first comprehensive review of the condition of health and 
discipline and their interaction within the Army.  The Army Gold Book, a follow-up to 
this report, was produced in 2012.  Both reports reference the Army Study to Assess Risk 
and Resilience in Servicemembers (STARRS) and the Event Cycle and Care Continuum. 
The purpose of Army STARRS is to “identify modifiable risk and protective 
factors and moderators of suicidal behavior to inform the Army’s ongoing efforts to 
prevent suicide and improve soldiers’ overall psychological health and functioning” (U.S. 
Army, 2009, p. 229).  The study has collected detailed information on psychological and 
physical health, such as the information categories shown in Figure 3.  It examines 
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exposure to adverse events, attitudes, social support, leadership and unit climate, training 
and knowledge, employment and economic status, family history and other potentially 
relevant data from over 300,000 soldiers (U.S. Army, 2009, pp. 229–230).  
 
Figure 3.  Health and Disciplinary Maze Model for the Army population at risk  
(From U.S. Army, 2012, p. 6) 
The Event Cycle and Care Continuum in Figure 4 describes how Army leaders 
respond to at-risk and high-risk soldiers.  There are two parts to this model: the Event 
Cycle, the sequence of events that affects the soldiers; and, the Care Continuum, the 
institution’s response to each event, such as increased surveillance and detection of 
indicators associated with a potential or actual event (U.S. Army, 2012).  
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Figure 4.  The Event Cycle and Care Continuum (From U.S. Army, 2012, p. 7) 
Combined, the risk demographics identified by STARRS and the processes in this model 
represent the two sides of every risk reduction effort—the soldiers as the lowest level 
users and the leaders who facilitate help-seeking behavior from the top down.   
ASPP resources should bridge the gap between these two sides.  Unfortunately, 
“suicide does not fit cleanly into any of the groupings of problems for which prevention 
models have been developed” (Silverman & Felner, 1995, p. 2).  Although progress has 
been made in recent years, this still remains particularly true within military populations.  
Silverman and Felner (1995) arrived at four basic questions for a systematic framework 
to organize analytical thinking about SP: 
 What do we mean by the concept of “prevention” when applied to suicide?  
 Who are the target groups of suicide prevention versus, for example, 
intervention?  
 What and where is the focus of suicide intervention?  
 What are the goals of SP programs? (p. 2) 
In measuring system effectiveness, analysts recognize there are independent 
variables that, when manipulated, influence dependent variables.  In most business 
processes for example, system performance influences the cost of the system.  The 
simplest cost-effectiveness relationships can be represented linearly.  However, more 
complex systems require a multivariate approach.  Consequently, a linear approach to SP 
with clear factors that predict suicide behavior “is simply not well suited to the reduction 
of the incidence of suicide” (Silverman & Felner, 1995, p. 3).  
The ASPP, as with other SP programs, includes suicide reduction efforts before, 
during, and after suicide events have occurred.  The background research on prevention 
strategies will cover SP efforts that can include: 1) reduction of levels of risk or 
increasing levels of protective factors, 2) reduction of the incidence rates of personal 
vulnerabilities or the enhancement of personal competencies and strengths, and 3) 
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alteration of risk and protective factors to produce resilience in the face of serious 
challenge  (Silverman & Felner, 1995).  The value of identifying gaps in these strategies 
and adjusting the program to fit these mismatches is the key to this research.  Senior  
Army leadership has recognized the need for a multi-faceted approach to SP and 
behavioral health (BH) services and has implemented many programs to address this 
need.  
One of the main problems in SP is that while the absolute number of suicides in a 
population is cumulatively quite large, the risk of suicide for any given individual is 
relatively small (Bagley et al., 2010).  A particular aspect of SP development for military 
personnel that has gained particular attention in recent years is the amount of heightened 
stress anticipated during times of transition, during which time identifying individuals at 
higher risk and implementing treatment engagement protocols could be a means of 
enhancing SP efforts (Brenner & Barnes, 2012).  Although major challenges exist in 
trying to predict who may fall victim to suicidal behavior, resource providers have begun 
to focus on target areas and events that have indicators for increased stressors and could 
lead to suicide. 
In the 2011 U.S. Congressional hearing on military SP programs, the Army 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (G-1) testified, “In FY 2010, 257,537 soldiers 
accessed outpatient BH care (ranging from screening to therapy) and 9,392 soldiers 
received inpatient BH care.  This [was] an increase from 216,222 and 9,201 in the 
previous year” (The current status of suicide prevention programs in the military, 2011, 
p. 47).  However, there were 147 confirmed and 13 suspected Army suicides within the 
same year (National Center for Telehealth and Technology (T2), 2010).  Despite 
increases in BH service usage during this time, suicide numbers still showed evidence of 
an obvious problem.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Understanding where the mismatches are in soldiers using SP resources rests 
heavily on understanding how they conduct internal risk assessments, determine stress 
coping strategies, and decide to seek (or not seek) help.  This thesis conducts a bottom-up 
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analysis of the ASPP system, identifies inconsistencies between the system and its users, 
and provides insights into how at least some soldiers recover from suicidal ideations 
through the use of ASPP resources. 
The research question at the root of this analysis is whether there is a mismatch 
between the resources offered by the ASPP system and the needs of the soldiers who use 
the system.  The answer to this question will reveal whether there is a mismatch due to 
the system design.  Additional research questions include: 
 Does the assessment of ASPP system vary between those who have 
previous experience with suicide and those who do not? 
 Is there a difference in system assessments between soldiers of different 
genders and rank categories? 
 Does the stigma associated with help-seeking behavior contribute to risk-
taking behavior? 
D. THE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PERSPECTIVE 
A system is a set of interrelated components functioning together toward some 
common objective or purpose.  It can be associated with all kinds of products, structures, 
and services (Blanchard & Fabrycky, 2011).  In the systems design phase, system 
engineers must conduct an analysis of the stakeholders involved in the system, define the 
system requirements based on stakeholder needs, and decompose tasks that the system 
will accomplish to meet these requirements.   
The systems engineering (SE) product life cycle can be divided into two phases: 
the acquisition phase and the utilization phase.  The acquisition phase is composed of 
conceptual/preliminary design, detail design and development, and production/ 
construction.  The utilization phase includes product implementation, support, phase-out, 
and disposal (Blanchard & Fabrycky, 2011).   
Analysis of a system once it has been implemented is important to ensuring the 
effectiveness of design parameters.  For this thesis, the focus of the SE perspective was 
assessing the product implementation and support, including system sustainment.  System 
sustainment includes, among other topics, manpower, personnel capability, training, 
habitability, survivability, environment, safety, occupational health, protection of critical 
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program information, and information technology (U.S. Army MANPRINT Directorate, 
2011b).  During sustainment, system operators, trainers, and maintainers are able to 
provide feedback on what works well and what does not.   
Fundamentally, “systems thinking and the systems viewpoint looks at a system 
from the top down rather than from the bottom up” (Blanchard & Fabrycky, 2011, p. 5).  
However, HSI incorporates the bottom-up perspective into the SE process.  Top-down 
viewpoints include those from the perspective of upper-level stakeholders, while bottom-
up is from the user standpoint.  The top-down systems approach must be complemented 
by the bottom-up HSI view when determining system effectiveness. 
E. HUMAN SYSTEMS INTEGRATION 
The analytical framework used for this research is based on HSI and SE. 
Integrating human considerations into system design is the ultimate goal of HSI.  The 
Army G-1 oversees Army HSI under the MANPRINT Program.  The program’s mission 
is to achieve system design objectives that “ensure that the needs of the Soldier and unit 
are considered throughout the system acquisition process and life cycle by incorporating 
related considerations from the seven key design areas: Manpower, Personnel 
Capabilities, Training, Human Factors Engineering, Safety, Health Hazards, and Soldier 
Survivability” (U.S. Army MANPRINT Directorate, 2011b, MANPRINT Directorate 
Programs section, para. 1). HSI practitioners determine how to best integrate 
considerations for each domain into system design in order to optimize total system 
performance.  
The MANPRINT objectives are as follows:  
1) Optimize both the quantity and quality of the personnel needed for 
systems; 2) Design systems that are easily useable by soldiers, safe to 
operate, cause no unnecessary health problems, and maximize Soldier 
survivability; and 3) Ensure acceptable trade-offs are made among 
performance, design, and Soldier capabilities and limits. (U.S. Army 
MANPRINT Directorate, 2011a, p. 1) 
Each domain used to achieve these objectives is described in further detail below:  
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 Manpower: Manpower addresses the number of military and civilian 
personnel required and potentially available to operate, maintain, sustain, 
and provide training for systems.  
 Personnel Capabilities: Personnel addresses the cognitive and physical 
characteristics and capabilities required to be able to train for, operate, 
maintain, and sustain materiel and information systems. Personnel 
capabilities are normally reflected as Knowledge, Skills, Abilities, and 
Other characteristics (KSAOs).  
 Training: Training is defined as the instruction, education, on-the-job, or 
self-development training required providing all personnel and units with 
essential job skills, and knowledge. Training is required to bridge the gap 
between the target audience’s existing level of knowledge and that 
required to effectively operate, deploy/employ, maintain and support the 
system.  
 Human Factors Engineering (HFE): The goal of HFE is to maximize 
the ability of an individual or crew to operate and maintain a system at 
required levels by eliminating design-induced difficulty and error. Human 
Factors engineers work with systems engineers to design and evaluate 
human-system interfaces to ensure they are compatible with the 
capabilities and limitations of the potential user population.  
 System Safety (SS): System Safety is the design features and operating 
characteristics of a system that serve to minimize the potential for human 
or machine errors/failures that cause injurious accidents. 
 Health Hazards (HH): Health Hazards addresses the design features and 
operating characteristics of a system that create significant risks of bodily 
injury or death. Along with safety hazards, an assessment of health 
hazards is necessary to determine risk reduction or mitigation.  Health 
hazards include those areas that could cause death, injury, illness, 
disability, or a reduction in job performance.  
 Soldier Survivability (SSv): Soldier survivability addresses the 
characteristics of a system that can reduce fratricide, detectability, and 
probability of being attacked, as well as minimize system damage, soldier 
injury, and cognitive and physical fatigue. It was added to focus attention 
on those aspects of the total system that can minimize the loss of friendly 
troops’ lives. (U.S. Army MANPRINT Directorate, 2005, p. 2—5) 
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The Chapters following are the literature review, method, results, and conclusion.  
The literature review covers the SE and HSI concepts, which provides the foundation of 
this analysis.  The Chapter also presents the history and structure of the ASPP system, an 
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overview of the ASPP system design process, HSI applicability, and the ASPP system 
components.  In laying out these topics, we will be able to see how this research will help 
identify mismatches in the ASPP system.   
The initial system analysis facilitated the development of the system’s operational 
view (OV) model, which captures the roles, objectives, and tasks within the Prevention 
activities of the system.  The two Chapters covering the methods explain the two-pronged 
approach of conducting a retrospective analysis of suicides events in previous years, as 
well a bottom-up analysis of the ASPP system through interviews with soldiers.  The 
analysis of results and recommendations will describe the gaps discovered and 







II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. BACKGROUND 
Given the rise and persistence of actual and attempted suicides in the Army, much 
discussion has focused on providing the right balance of training, surveillance, and 
services for soldiers in order to alleviate suicidal tendencies.  This literature review will 
cover the history of suicide in the Army and the development of the ASPP system; the 
HSI concepts used in this analysis; the system inputs, processes, and outputs; and the 
strategies for effective SP program design recommended by current research.  These 
sections lay the foundation for the development of the ASPP system OV model. 
Suicide is now the tenth leading cause of death in the United States (Caine, 2012).  
Although many theories exist for what causes suicide, an accepted view is found in the 
combination of two key factors: an underlying risk and capacity for suicide and 
psychological stress or loss.  Suicidal behavior resulting from the combination of these 
two factors present themselves in the form of suicidal events, including suicidal ideations 
or thoughts, suicide planning and attempts, and suicide completions (Lineberry & 
O’Connor, 2012).  A person is more likely to die by suicide if he or she has attempted 
suicide in the past (Lineberry & O’Connor, 2012).  The majority of current research into 
Army suicide numbers focuses on completed suicides, but here we will also address 
ideations and attempts.   
1. The Need for the Suicide Discussion 
The ASPP began in 1984 and in 2001 the Army G-1, the Office of the Surgeon 
General (OTSG), and the Office of the Chief of Chaplains (OCCH) completed a review 
of the program, concluding the program was “basically sound” but needed increased 
emphasis in leadership involvement.  The result of this effort was the initial refinement of 
the program’s five major strategies, which will be covered in the next section.  The years 
following saw the inclusion of the Applied Suicide Intervention Skills Training (ASIST) 
and Question, Persuade, Refer (QPR) workshops as additional training resources 
(Department of Defense Task Force on the Prevention of Suicide by Members of the 
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Armed Forces (TFPS), 2010).  Battlemind Training, the predecessor to Resilience 
Training, was implemented in 2006 to help soldiers meet the “mental challenges of 
training, operations, combat, and transitioning home” (TFPS, 2010, p. 18). 
From 1985 to 2005, the Army’s active duty suicide rate was between 10–15 
suicides per 100,000 persons per year, which was below the age- and sex-adjusted rate in 
the civilian population (Cersovsky, 2011).  However, this statistic changed in 2008, when 
the DoD reported a 50 percent increase in completed suicides among the active duty 
military population (James, 2012).  From 2003 to 2008, the rate of Army psychiatric 
hospitalizations almost doubled.  Lineberry and O’Connor (2012) note:  
There seems to be a gap in terms of service members receiving outpatient 
clinical care for psychiatric issues, because only 23 percent to 40 percent 
of those meeting the criteria for a mental disorder on military post-
deployment screening sought care.  The underuse of clinical services may 
be related to concerns of stigma against personnel seeking help and 
treatment.  Notably, service members who screen positive for a mental 
disorder have been shown to be twice as likely to report stigmatizations as 
a possible barrier to seeking clinical care compared with those not 
screening positive. (pp. 874—875) 
The Army stood up the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness (CSF) Directorate in 
October 2008 to improve Soldier resilience in emotional, social, spiritual, family, and 
physical areas; the Army SP Task Force was also established in March 2009 to address 
rising suicide rates (TFPS, 2010).  Despite its relation to the SP continuum, all CSF 
efforts are explicitly separate from the ASPP.  In 2009, mental disorders were the highest 
diagnostic category for hospitalizations among U.S. active duty military members, 
reiterating the need for effective programs to address BH and public health issues 
(Cersovsky, 2011).  The DoD established the TFPS in August 2009 based on a directive 
in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (TFPS, 2010). 
As combat operations decreased in Iraq, the number of suicides in the Army 
continued to climb, eclipsing the number of combat deaths in 2012.  Clifton reports “an 
average of one military suicide occurred each day in the first six months of 2012, the 
fastest pace in the past ten years” (Clifton, 2012, para. 1).  Figure 5 shows the number of 
suicides by service through June in each of the last five years.  
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Figure 5.  Number of Military Suicides Escalating—Suicides in the U.S. Military have  
risen significantly since America began a decade of war  
(From Clifton, 2012, para. 2). 
The number of suicides in the Army is significantly higher than in the other 
services.  Despite the depth and breadth of risk reduction resources available, some 
Servicemembers seem to be averse to seeking professional help.  Further proving the 
tragic nature of current suicide statistics, a January 2013 report by the Associated Press 
announced the record “349 suicides among active-duty troops last year were up from 301 
the year before and exceeded the Pentagon’s own internal projection of 325” (Burns, 
2013, para. 3).  Because monthly suicide statistics include only confirmed suicides, we 
expect the final number of suicides in 2012 were even higher, once all investigations 
were complete.   
Over the last 10 years, epidemiological consultation teams (EPICONs) have 
conducted reviews at Army bases that have experienced high suicide or homicide rates. 
Mental Health Advisory Teams (MHATs), led by Army researchers from the Walter 
Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR), have administered surveys in Iraq and 
Afghanistan roughly once a year (Ritchie, 2012).  In response to suicide rate hikes over 
the last few years, both the DoD and the Army task forces aimed to gain a “better 
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understanding [of] the precipitants of military suicide—especially those that may be 
unique to this particular population” (Ritchie, 2012, p. 2).  Two trends drawn from these 
study efforts may prove surprising to some, given the stressful nature of military 
deployment life.   
First, the data did not support the assumption that multiple deployments were 
linked to an increased risk of suicide.  Instead, “79 percent of the suicides recorded by the 
Army in fiscal year 2009 were soldiers who had completed only a single deployment or 
had not deployed at all” (Ritchie, 2012, p. 5).  Furthermore, over the last seven years, 
about one-third of the soldiers who commit suicide have never deployed (Ritchie, 2012). 
Second, Ritchie (2012) concludes a unit’s deployment history, rather than the 
individual’s deployment history, seemed to be a greater contributor to suicide risk.  Army 
installations each have characteristics unique to the type of units based there and the 
geographical locations in which they are found.  The data gathered dismisses the simple 
assumption made both within and outside of the military that suicidal soldiers are 
responding primarily to the stress of deployments.  The fact that this assumption proves 
untrue adds more attention to a problem that has continued to get worse over the years.  
Determining the actual contributors to soldiers’ stress and their pre-existing conditions is 
necessary to properly designing the system.  In the overview of the ASPP system, we 
explore how the Army is furthering efforts to determine and mitigate suicide causal 
factors.  
2. Applicability of HSI to ASPP Analysis  
The performance of the ASPP system specifically depends on use of the system 
by soldiers, families, and leaders in order to decrease suicides.   This thesis assessed the 
HSI considerations on the system design through interviews with system users and 
analysis of interview results using various techniques.  Soldier Survivability is the 
primary HSI domain focus for this research.  Safety, Manpower, Personnel, Training, 




training efforts, personnel qualifications, and safety procedures when dealing with BH 
issues can ensure Soldier Survivability.  Each domain’s applicability to the ASPP 
analysis is as follows: 
 Soldier Survivability: Suicide has major implications for soldier 
survivability.  Though suicide is a personal choice that some choose to 
make, being able to recognize suicidal ideations and assist an individual in 
receiving help will increase survivability in terms of suicide. 
 Safety: The availability and continuous use of all SP resources is vital to 
maximizing the safety of all soldiers.  The ability of a fellow soldier or 
leader to point a Soldier in the right direction for help is an indicator of a 
unit’s preparedness.   
 Manpower/Personnel/Training: The selection criteria for trained unit 
level gatekeepers, such as Master Resilience Trainers, and the amount and 
method of training ensure the right people are assigned to positions that 
directly facilitate the ASPP.  The use of an effective needs assessment 
process and a Target Audience Description should be encouraged and 
reviewed regularly.  The type of resources used may be related to the 
abilities of the personnel affected and the number of resources available is 
directly related to manpower levels.  Effective training must include these 
considerations.   
 Health Hazards: Many of the risk factors associated with suicide are 
directly related to health matters.  Often the particular focus on BH issues 
can overshadow the influence of medical and physiological issues.  When 
health hazards go unrecognized or untreated over time, they can put 
individuals into extremely high states of stress.  By informing users and 
management of these health hazards we can ensure their identification and 
minimization is a part of daily organizational processes.  
 Human Factors Engineering: The myriad of resources available can be 
divided into in-person assistance, online assistance, and telephonic aid.  
The manner in which these resources are presented is primarily through 
the ASPP Website.  In its current state, the site presents a lot of 
information with minimal focus on Human Computer Interaction 
considerations.  The introduction of mobile applications for these 
resources also provides the potential for increased use of the tools and 
better usability.  Efforts should be made to provide resources in a manner 
that facilitates use and does not overwhelm the user. 
3. HSI Tools, Techniques, Approaches, and Methods 
This analysis employed the use of recognized HSI Tools, Techniques, 
Approaches, and Methods (TTAMs).  In addition to using electronic research to gain 
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background information on the ASPP system, the following TTAMs allowed for 
organization of information gathered during background research, further data gathering 
from users, and synthesis of results. 
a. Hierarchical Task Analysis 
Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA) is a technique for task analysis that 
represents the relationship between task and subtask (Kirwan & Ainsworth, 1992).  
Considered a broad approach to task analysis, developing the HTA includes stating the 
goal to be achieved, developing task/sub-task order and descriptions, and identifying the 
operations required to accomplish the tasks  (Kirwan & Ainsworth, 1992).  
There were four documents primarily used in this research that provided 
an objective starting point for the HTA of the ASPP system: Army Regulation (AR) 600-
63: Army Health Promotion; Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 600-24: 
Health Promotion, Risk Reduction, and Suicide Prevention; Final Report of the TFSP; 
and the RAND Corporation’s The War Within: Preventing Suicide in the U.S. Military.  
Additional resources also provided details on the primary and secondary tasks within the 
system.   
b. Semi-Structured Interviews 
A semi-structured interview differs from a structured interview in that it 
allows the researcher to incorporate questions based on the respondent’s previous 
responses.  The term “structured” means the content of the interview is pre-determined 
(Kirwan & Ainsworth, 1992, p. 66).  During the soldier interviews, we used a standard 
list of questions for each type of respondent and adjusted follow-on questions 
accordingly.  The interviews were not used to determine risk factors for suicide, but to 
garner feedback on how the systematic construct of the ASPP was viewed and assessed 
by the users.  
c. Link Analysis 
Link analysis techniques were used to analyze the results.  The links are 
the connections between stakeholders and other stakeholders, between stakeholders and 
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the system, and between upper-level system managers and lower-level system managers. 
These links provided insight into the reasons for and impacts of system mismatches.  At 
its core, link analysis is a “representation technique, providing the means to record and 
represent the nature, frequency and/or importance of links within a system” (Kirwan & 
Ainsworth, 1992, p. 119).  
B. ASPP SYSTEM OVERVIEW 
1. The Army’s Response to an Epidemic 
The ASPP’s stated mission is to “improve readiness through the development and 
enhancement of the ASPP policies designed to minimize suicide behavior; thereby 
preserving mission effectiveness through individual readiness for soldiers, their families, 
and DA civilians” (Army G-1, 2012, Mission section, para. 1).  The ASPP can be 
classified as a system whose users include all Army military and civilian members and 
their families.  This system provides policies and services and has additional complexity 
due to the nature of those services.   AR 600-23 describes the two arms of SP: the 
formation of a Community Health Promotion Council (CHPC) (specific to the installation 
and without equivalence in deployed zones) and leader/soldier actions (Warner, C. H., 
Appenzeller, G. N., Parker, J. R., Warner, C., Diebold, C. J., & Grieger, T., 2011).  
On a simplistic level, the ASPP system inputs include the users and their 
backgrounds, conditions, and environments.  The outputs of this system are the number 
of suicides, with lower numbers being indicative of system effectiveness.  System 
processes include the identification of risks, the assignment of resources to these risks, 
and the help seeking or risk-taking behaviors that result.  Upon closer inspection, the 
ASPP is much more complex; this thesis describes and investigates the ASPP system in 
greater detail.   
Properly designing this system means effectively meeting the objectives at the top 
and ensuring the resources meet the identified needs at the bottom.  The gaps identified in 
this study will assist in determining focus areas for analysis.  Combining this study’s 
conclusions with the Army’s reports provides a comprehensive view of the current 
successes and shortfalls of the ASPP system.  
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2. System Inputs 
a. Key Stakeholders 
The key stakeholders for the ASPP system include senior Army 
leadership, supporting commands for research and implementation, installation and unit 
leadership, and end users.  End users include Army soldiers, civilians, and family 
members; however, this research focuses on soldiers.   
The Army G-1 is the Army staff proponent for the ASPP system.  Under 
supervision of the Health Promotion Risk Reduction Division, the Army G-1’s role 
includes coordination and monitoring as follows (U.S. Army, 2010a, p. 3): 
 Ensure that the ASPP is coordinated with, and nested within, the 
DoD Issuance responsible for Department of Defense-wide SP 
efforts. 
 Ensure that the ASPP is represented on the Defense Centers of 
Excellence (DCoE) SP and Risk Reduction Council (SPRRC). 
 Establish policy to provide health promotion, risk reduction, and 
SP program policy for non-installation based commands and 
geographically dispersed soldiers, to include Army National Guard 
(ARNG) and United States Army Reserve (USAR) components. 
 Collect data to regulate, validate, and approve suicide-related event 
databases. 
 Collect data and analyze suicide-related data for risk factors 
surrounding suicidal behavior to assist in the development and/or 
sustainment of effective strategies to reduce suicides and suicide 
attempts. 
 Review and evaluate SP programs and their implementation. 
 Primary source for reporting of official Army suicide rates. 
The OCCH coordinates SP activities and training with the G-1 and The 
Surgeon General (TSG) (U.S. Army, 2010a, p. 4).  The Surgeon General provides 
guidance in accordance with AR 350-1 in medical, physiological, and health areas 
including BH, nutrition, cardiovascular risk-factor reduction, and stress management. 
TSG establishes and reviews policy development in health promotion, SP, and other 
areas. Additionally, TSG oversees the medical aspects of Army training programs in SP 
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and provides training for health care providers in suicide-risk identification and treatment 
for patients who may be at increased risk of suicide (U.S. Army, 2010a).   
Each installation is required to establish a Suicide Prevention Task Force 
(SPTF), as a part of the CHPC to plan, implement, and manage the local ASPP.  The 
membership of this task force will be tailored to meet local needs.  A Suicide Prevention 
Program Manager (SPPM) serves as the chair of the Suicide Prevention Task Force 
(SPTF).  The CHPC is a council of tenant organizations that provides a comprehensive 
approach to health promotion, and is the designated representative of the senior 
commander to provide comprehensive health promotion policy and programs that are 
applicable to all garrison residents.  The SPTF serves the following purposes (U.S. Army, 
2010a, p. 8): 
 Coordinate program activities and the SP activities of the 
command, interested agencies, and persons. 
 Evaluate program needs and make appropriate recommendations to 
the commander. 
 Review, refine, add, or delete items to the program based on an 
ongoing evaluation of needs. 
 Develop awareness training for SP activities and identify 
appropriate forums for training. 
 Evaluate the impact of the pace of training and military operations 
on the quality of individual and Family life in the military 
community. 
 Recommend command policy guidance for training and operations 
issues to assure that soldiers and their leaders have sufficient 
opportunity for quality Family life. 
 Be aware of publicity generated with respect to suicides in the 
community and develop public awareness articles for publication. 
 Meet at the discretion of the task force presiding officer. 
 In the event of a suicide, review the results of the psychological 
autopsy (as applicable) to look for the possible causes of the 
suicide and, if necessary, evaluate prevention efforts and make 
recommendations to the commander. 
 Coordinate with civilian support agencies, as necessary. 
 Implement an integrated Family member SP program. 
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 The SPPM accomplishes the following tasks (U.S. Army, 2010a, p. 
8): 
 Administers the SP program for both military and civilian 
members with a goal to reduce suicides. 
 Serves as the presiding officer of the Suicide Prevention Task 
Force and coordinates the efforts of task force members. 
 Serves as a member of the CHPC representing SP issues and 
providing input into related programs. 
 Tracks the training of all Ask/Care/Escort (ACE)-certified 
personnel and ACE training for the installation, state, and RSC. 
 Serves as the point of contact for program information and advice 
to the commander and to major subordinate commands. 
 Integrates SP into community, Family, and Soldier support 
programs as appropriate. 
 Coordinates with internal and external organizations to share 
information, trends, best practices, lessons learned, and training 
developments.  
 Supporting Army agencies include the U.S. Army Public Health 
Command (PHC), the U.S. Army Medical Research & Materiel 
Command (MRMC).  The PHC’s primary stakeholder perspective 
is to provide oversight and assessment of the implementation of the 
ASPP from the public health perspective.  The MRMC conducts 
research and acquisition activities that relate to the ASPP system.  
Together, these commands supplement policy development and 
system implementation within the Army.  
Unit leadership includes the Major Command (MACOM), Installation 
Management Command (IMCOM), senior command, garrison command, and unit 
command teams.  MACOM/IMCOM leadership is responsible for appointing the 
CHP/SP coordinators and developing and implementing a SP plan appropriate for their 
command (U.S. Army, 2010a).  Senior commanders have the overall responsibility for 
health promotion, risk reduction, and SP efforts.  Garrison commanders (U.S. Army, 
2010a):  
 Establish and chair a CHPC. 
 Partner with the Medical Command (MEDCOM) in implementing 
health promotion programs, to include providing facilities support 
and staff assistance for unit health promotion events. 
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 Monitor aggregate data and implement a health promotion program 
at their installations in accordance with this regulation and 
instructions from their commanders. 
 Appoint a task force or committee and designate a presiding officer 
to plan, implement, and manage the ASPP. 
 Coordinate with union organizations representing Army civilians, 
as applicable. 
 Encourage all members of the CHPC to attend the Army Health 
Promotion Course. 
For the purposes of this thesis, the unit command team is the lowest level 
Company Commander and First Sergeant.  Soldiers report directly to the unit command 
team for military matters and the unit command team is responsible for the overall health 
and welfare of each soldier.  Because suicide is different for every individual, the soldier 
and his or her needs should be a priority consideration for the system design.  Figure 6 
summarizes the system’s key stakeholders and their relationships. 
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Figure 6.  ASPP Key Stakeholders and Relationships 
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b. User Needs 
User needs are vast and varied, given the intricate nature of suicidality.  
While volumes of research exist on the risk factors associated with higher likelihood of 
suicide, it is not matched by an equal amount of analysis on suicide minimizing factors in 
the general sense.  Additionally, a full needs assessment for the military population with 
relation to system design was not accomplished prior to the implementation of the ASPP 
system.  Both Army doctrine and other literature were used to ensure the users’ needs list 
presented here was exhaustive.   
There were four needs explicitly identified in ASPP and TFPS documents.  
First, according to DA PAM 600-24, “most suicides and suicide attempts are reactions to 
one or more of the following intense feelings: loneliness, worthlessness, hopelessness, 
helplessness, and guilt” (U.S. Army, 2010b, pp. 10—11).  Although it goes on to present 
some ways to mitigate these feelings, neither AR 600-63, nor DA PAM 600-24 present a 
comprehensive list of factors that directly minimize these risks.  It is important to note 
epidemiological risk demographics associated with suicide should be viewed as 
preexisting conditions, not risk factors that can be minimized.  For example, a soldier’s 
age is a risk demographic, but the same soldier’s relationship problem is a risk factor.    
The AR notes the soldier’s ability to develop life coping skills as a SP 
need, but the ASPP does not include all protective factors within this regulation.  The 
CSF program, a separate entity, functions as the umbrella of efforts to increase soldiers’ 
protective factors.  However, the DoD TFPS’s final report presents a diagram in of risk 
factors and protective factors (see Figure 7); this offers the clearest juxtaposition found in 
the literature review of the risk factors versus protective factors.  This diagram suggests 
the need to maximize protective factors while minimizing risk factors. 
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Figure 7.  Risk and Protective Factors in SP (From TFPS, 2010, p. 37) 
Table 1 combines the information gathered from this needs overview and presents 
the author’s view of suicide risk factors along with their associated protective factors.  
Being able to articulate which protective factors contribute to decreasing which risks is 
vital in determining focus areas for training. 
Table 1.   Soldier Needs: Minimization of Risk Factors and  
Maximization of Protective Factors 
 
 
Third, the regulation emphatically states, “the key to the prevention of 
suicide is positive leadership and deep concern by supervisors of military personnel and 
civilian employees who are at increased risk of suicide” (U.S. Army, 2010a, p. 14).  
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Fourth, the need for appropriate involvement by gatekeepers is focused on the need for 
buddy care.  “Buddy” is a term primarily applied to a soldier’s friends, but may also be 
acceptable when referring to those who have loose interaction in the same unit or 
installation.  The Army’s intent is for each to consider another soldier a buddy when 
identifying and minimizing suicide risk. 
c. Design Strategy 
The ASPP system design strategy is an outgrowth of national, defense, 
and Army strategies.  In 2001, the Surgeon General’s National Strategy for SP 
“recommended the Gatekeeper Model of SP” (Claassen, n.d., p. 20).  Most prevention 
methods fall into two categories: reducing risk factors for suicide or seeking out people at 
risk for suicide for referral and eventual treatment, or case finding (Isaac et al., 2009).  As 
the main strategy the Army adopted for prevention training, it is important to note a 2009 
observation, “gatekeeper training shows promise for multifaceted prevention strategies by 
increasing the KSAs of trainees” (Isaac et al., 2009, p. 66).  Gatekeeper training 
continues to be the focal point of SP training and buddy care is a well-known phrase 
among soldiers.  
Since its inception, the system continues to include the National Strategy 
for SP as it changes.  The 2012 National Strategy for SP is organized into four 
interconnected strategic directions: “Healthy and Empowered Individuals, Families, and 
Communities; Clinical and Community Preventive Services; Treatment and Support 
Services; Surveillance, Research, and Evaluation” (U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (Office of the Surgeon General and National Action Alliance for Suicide 
Prevention (NAASP), 2012, p. 24).  The strategy goes on to say “SP interventions, 
products, and services should be tailored to the cultural, linguistic, and other needs of 
each group” (NAASP, 2012, p. 25). 
In the final report by the TFPS, the members reaffirm the need for a 




presented 18 strategies and 13 foundational recommendations (see Appendix A) for the 
DoD to adopt to enhance SP efforts, noting, “each of the focus areas both informs and 
builds on one another” (TFPS, 2010, p. 35).    
 
Figure 8.  Developing a Comprehensive SP Strategy (From TFPS, 2010, p. 35) 
Ramchand (2011) identifies six recommended primary activities of a SP 
program based on the RAND Corporation’s comparison and assessment of each of the 
DOD SP programs.  These top-level activities are: raise awareness and promote self-care, 
identify those at risk, facilitate access to quality care, deliver quality care, restrict access 
to lethal means, and respond appropriately.  Table 2 shows a summary of the state of 
these activities by service at the time of the report’s publication.  Activities highlighted in 
green represent those being accomplished effectively, amber activities are being 






Table 2.   Assessment of Suicide Prevention Activities across the Services  
(From Ramchand, 2011, p. 106) 
 
 
The Air Force established a multilayered array of initiatives and 
“demonstrated that a public health approach saved lives involving multiple forms of 
violent death—suicide, homicide, and accidental death—as it targeted antecedent 
morbidity (e.g., family violence, alcohol use, financially related tensions) using a 
‘common risk’ strategy” (Caine, 2012, p. S4).   In praising the Air Force’s efforts, Bryan, 
Jennings, Jobes, and Bradley (2012) note how its implementation of this population-
based program in 1997 succeeded in reducing suicide deaths by one-third.  Although the 
Army may not be able to replicate all of the Air Force’s approaches due to cultural 
differences, there is value in determining which of their best practices can be transferred 
into the ASPP. 
The Army’s five major strategies for SP are outlined in AR 600-63 as: 
“developing positive life coping skills; encouraging help-seeking behavior; raising 
awareness of and vigilance towards suicide prevention; synchronizing, integrating, and 
managing the ASPP; and conducting suicide surveillance, analysis, and reporting” (U.S. 
Army, 2010a, pp. 15–16).  Unit commanders design their SP training programs with 
input from their higher headquarters and the ASPP Program Manager’s office. 
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3. System Processes  
The initial task decomposition for the ASPP system activities includes the five-
pronged, three-phased approach as the means to accomplish the system’s activities. As 
previously stated, the five strategies are accomplished in the three SP phases of 
prevention, intervention, and postvention (see Figure 9).   
 
Figure 9.  ASPP Phases and Strategies (Note: Descriptions from U.S. Army, 2010c, p. 1) 
Although the ASPP system does not present groups of activities in a 
chronological order, prevention can minimize suicide activity prior to a suicide event 
developing.  In addressing suicide issues, prevention can overlap the other two phases of 
activities, especially for those who have had previous suicide events.  There are three 
types of interfaces created to accomplish prevention tasks: human interfaces, system 
interfaces, and physical interfaces.   
The human interfaces are the development of relationships that lead to gatekeeper 
interaction, as well as the use of human and medical resources provided for assistance.  
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An example of a human interface within the system is the use of Chaplain services for 
those who seek help with spiritual fitness during major life stressors.  For the purposes of 
this study, system interfaces are those actions taken to connect the user to the system.  In 
other words, these interfaces ensure the user knows how to operate the system, what the 
system provides, and the roles of other system users.  This is mainly accomplished for the 
ASPP system as unit SP training, annual and supplemental.  Different user roles may 
dictate different levels of training.  The physical interfaces are those objects used to 
inform users, provide strategic communication of messages and themes, and give users a 
means of facilitating the other two interfaces.  The most common physical interfaces are 
pamphlets, videos, and Web pages.   
4. System Outputs  
The primary system outputs for the ASPP are the human-system interactions and 
the annual suicide statistics. Chapter III will describe the steps taken to conduct a 
retrospective analysis of this information for suicide statistics from 2008—2011, using 
the DoD Suicide Event Reports (DoDSERs) as the primary data sources. 
The Army Suicide Event Report (ASER) replaced the psychological autopsy and 
was implemented beginning in 2003 (Ritchie, 2012).  In 2008, the DoD mandated the use 
of the DoDSER as a standardized suicide event report across the services using the 
process outlined in Figure 10. Each year, T2 produces an annual report that summarizes 
and analyzes the statistics associated with these reports. The annual report presents data 
for the entire DoD and each service.  Given the changing in the format from the original 
formats in 2006 and 2007, only the DoDSERs from 2008—2011 were analyzed for this 
research.  
Within the DoDSER, there are sections for Communication of Intent, Treatment 
History, and Additional Event Information.  These sections show the statistics for those 
who had a suicide event (that was reported) and also interacted with a human interface 
within the system.  Comparing these sections can help relate the instances of suicidal 
behavior to system interactions leading up to the event.   
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Figure 10.  DoDSER Process Flowchart.  (From Gahm et al., 2012, p. 25) 
5. Summary 
Given its importance in the SP continuum and applicability to the widest range of 
users, the research team scoped this study to activities within the prevention phase.  
Using the knowledge gained from electronic research and communications with subject 
matter experts, the ASPP HTA was developed using a variation of frequently used HTA 
formats (see Appendix B).  Consistent with the focus of this research, the HTA was 
translated into the OV model in Figure 11 to summarize how the prevention activities 
within the system should operate.  The prevention efforts are defined as follows: 
Prevention focuses on preventing normal life “stressors” from turning into 
life crises. “Prevention Programming” focuses on equipping the Soldier, 
Family member, and Army DA civilian with coping skills to handle 
overwhelming life circumstances.  Prevention includes early screening to 
establish baseline mental health and to offer specific remedial programs 
before dysfunctional behavior occurs.  Prevention is dependent upon 
caring and proactive unit leaders and managers who make the effort to 
know their personnel, including estimating their ability to handle stress, 
and who offer a positive, cohesive environment which nurtures, and 
develops positive life-coping skills. These “gatekeepers” serve as the first 
line of defense to mitigate risk. (U.S. Army, 2010b, p. 4) 
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Figure 11.  ASPP System OV Model for Prevention Activities 
To assess the effectiveness of these activities, the interviews addressed the 
research questions restated below: 
 Is there a mismatch between the resources offered by the ASPP system 
and the needs of the soldiers who use the system? 
 Does the assessment of ASPP system vary between those who have 
previous experience with suicide and those who do not? 
 Is there a difference in system assessments between soldiers of different 
genders and rank categories? 
 Does the stigma associated with help-seeking behavior contribute to risk-
taking behavior? 
Due to the absence of a user needs assessment, the lack of integration of more 
protective factors into the ASPP documents, and top-down design approach, the research 
team predicted there would be a mismatch between the system resources and the user 
needs.  The research team also predicted there would be a difference in the user 
assessments based on rank, gender, and levels of experience with suicide.  More 
specifically, there would be less favorable assessments from those with higher ranks due 
 32
to the system’s focus on buddy care.  The research team did not make specific predictions 
based on gender and experience levels.  Finally, the research team predicted the existence 
of a stigma would minimize use of the system, and therefore contribute to risk-taking 
behavior. 
By identifying trends in the retrospective data and gathering users’ views of 
system interfaces, this analysis identified potential gaps in the system.  Properly 
designing prevention activities means effectively meeting the overall system objectives 
and ensuring the activities meet the identified user needs.  The gaps identified in this 
study will assist in determining focus areas for a comprehensive view of the current 
successes and shortfalls of the ASPP system.  Ideally, user needs should dictate the 
system design strategy and corresponding system processes. The next two Chapters detail 
the method used to examine the prevention activities from an HSI perspective.  
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III. RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS METHODS & RESULTS 
A. OVERVIEW 
This study was conducted using a combination of retrospective analysis and face-
to-face, semi-structured interviews.  The goal of the retrospective data analysis was to 
determine trends in suicide events and the use of ASPP human interfaces.  The goal of 
the interviews was to gain qualitative feedback from current ASPP system users.  This 
feedback describes their interaction with the ASPP system, assessment of the three types 
of systems interfaces, and recommendations for system improvements.  The variables of 
interest for this study included the rank, gender, and previous experience with suicide.  
The sample population was 24 volunteer participants at one Army installation.  The 
participants are described in the next Chapter. 
B. METHOD 
DoDSERs are submitted for all Active Component, Active Guard Reserve, and 
activated Reserve and Guard suicides (T2, 2009).  Therefore, this analysis only covers 
those soldiers on active duty orders during a suicide event.  The total number of suicide 
events reported annually from 2008—2011 was gathered from each of the DoDSER 
annual reports (completed by calendar year).  Table 3 shows the total counts and 
percentages by year for each suicide event category.  
Table 3.   2008—2011 Army DoDSER Submissions for Suicide Events  
 
 
The number of suicide completions is accurate as of the date of the annual report 
and not necessarily reflective of the total number of confirmed suicides for that year.  
Count % Count % Count % Count %
Suicide Completion 121 6% 154 7% 147 9% 159 9%
Suicide Attempt 591 28% 502 23% 413 24% 440 26%
Self-Harm (w/o intent to die) 418 19% 347 16% 237 14% 188 11%
Ideation Only 1017 47% 1198 54% 918 54% 888 53%
Total Suicide Events 2147 2201 1715 1675
Notes: Number Suicide Completions included in DODSER Annual Reports is not reflective of total
confirmed suicides; Multiple reports could be submitted for an individual
2008 2009 2010 2011
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Also, an individual can have multiple reports and each of those reports could be 
submitted independently from the other.  From these numbers, we see an increase in 
suicide events reported from 2008—2009, then a decrease in each of the next two years.  
More or less compliance with DoDSER reporting could also explain the changes between 
the years.  The percent of the reports for suicide completions increased from 2008—2010 
and remained the same from 2010—2011.  The only percentage that decreased each year 
was self-harm without intent to die.  The highest total number of events reported during 
these four years was in 2009.  For each year, the highest percentage of reports submitted 
was for ideations only.   
C. RESULTS 
Human interfaces include those people soldiers used for help with suicide, such as 
medical, religious, family, and work personnel.  The information provided by the 
DoDSER annual report does not include whether those resources were sought voluntarily 
or at the direction of the chain of command.  Figures 12 and 13 summarize these 
activities from two perspectives: those who received treatment prior to a suicide event 
and those who communicated their intent prior to a completed suicide.  The numbers 
reported are in percentages of the total for each category.   
A Medical Treatment Facility (MTF) or Outpatient BH (OBH) clinic saw the 
majority of soldiers with suicide event reports prior to a suicide event.  The next most 
frequented type of service was Inpatient BH (IBH).  The Chaplain, Army Substance 
Abuse Program (ASAP), and Family Advocacy Program (FAP) were the least frequently 
used services recorded for this population.   
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Figure 12.  Percentage of Soldiers who Received Treatment Prior to Suicide Event for 
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 36
 
Figure 13.  Percentage of Recipients of Communicated Intent prior to  
Completed Suicide for 2008—2011 DoDSER Annual Reports 
From 2008—2011, reports noted less than half of soldiers communicated intent to 
harm themselves before successfully committing suicide, with the highest year totaling 
approximately 30 percent in 2010.  The Chaplain was the resource to which intent was 
communicated the most each year, with a rate slightly above 7 percent for 2008 and 2009 
and above 11 percent for 2010 and 2011.  The next two categories that received 
communication of intent were Spouse and Other/Unidentified.  Friends receiving 
communication of intent was the lowest category in 2008 and the second lowest in 2009.  
However, this category received a significant spike in 2010 and 2011, surpassing Spouse, 
BH Provider, and Supervisor.  The overall lowest two categories were BH Provider and 
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D. LIMITATIONS 
The main limitation on the retrospective analysis was the format of the DoDSER 
annual reports.  The DoDSERs used for the 2008—2011 showed changes in formatting as 
time progressed.  Therefore, some categories present in 2008 and 2009 were no longer 
captured in 2010 and 2011.  Each year, the numbers from the previous year’s report were 
also updated.  The research team overcame this limitation by ensuring the information 
analyzed was the same for each year.  The level of detail provided in the annual reports 
was extremely helpful in answering the questions associated raised when understanding 
the reports.  Each report also provided summaries for the DoD and each service that 
captured major trends and changes from the previous year’s report format.  Also, the 
2012 DoDSER annual report was not complete in time for this study. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Examining trends for those who had suicide events reported between 2006 and 
2011 helped in the development of interview questions.  Despite the limitations of these 
reports and the lack of data available for 2012, from the results we gathered first insight 
into those resources that are used often and those that are not.   
More soldiers received treatment from an outpatient facility than an inpatient 
facility, which could indicate an issue with limited availability for inpatient treatment or 
issues with appointment availability.  Conversely, this could simply be indicative of the 
different treatment plans determined for the soldiers.  The fact that the Chaplain was the 
most frequent recipient of the communication of intent was not surprising.  However, the 
low use of Chaplain services prior to a suicide event was a concerning statistic.  Overall, 
better visibility of which resources are used and actually succeed in preventing a suicide 
event would increase accountability of the usefulness of the system.  Being able to 
compare mandatory treatment versus voluntary treatment would also be tremendously 




The conclusions drawn here were relatively subjective, but categories used in the 
DoDSERs reflect the various human and medical resources available for treatment and 
communication.  Asking soldiers their opinion on these same categories would provide 
feedback on the detection and reporting shortfalls within the system.   
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IV. DATA COLLECTION METHODS 
A. OVERVIEW 
The semi-structured interview format was used to determine the effectiveness of 
the ASPP system from the user’s perspective.  The first step in conducting the interviews 
was developing an appropriate set of questions to address the research questions.  Next, 
the population from which to sample volunteer participants was identified.  Finally, the 
researcher became familiar with the organizational and operational structure of the unit 
and volunteers were recruited and interviewed.   
Concurrent with developing the interview questions, the research team submitted 
an application to the NPS IRB to conduct human subjects research.  The application 
included a description of the research purpose, methodology, risks, and benefits.  Once 
the IRB application was approved, the researcher contacted a U.S. Army division 
personnel office for approval from the unit leadership to participate in the study.  
B. SAMPLE 
1. Unit Background  
The week prior to conducting the interviews, the researcher traveled to the unit 
and conducted in-briefs with the installation SPPM and the unit’s Assistant Chief of Staff 
for Personnel.  These meetings yielded important background and historical information 
on the unit’s organizational structure and the specifics of its SP program.  The researcher 
also observed a portion of installation ASIST training and the installation Newcomers’ 
Brief.  The Chaplain’s office was informed of the study and agreed to be available in the 
event of an emergency.  The researcher also conducted recruitment during this time. 
The SPPM provided an overview on her role at the installation SP office.  The 
office is co-located with and falls under the purview of the ASAP office.  She coordinates 
the installation’s SPTF meetings and can provide units annual SP training when 
requested,. When a suicide occurs, the units are not required to submit DoDSERs to the 
SPPM.  When asked about the SP coordination between the installation leadership, unit 
 40
commanders, and supporting medical and legal agencies, the SPPM lauded the locally 
established “Fusion Cell.”  The Fusion Cell is a collaborative entity that assists in 
providing unit leaders visibility over high-risk soldiers, shares information between 
command and tenet organizations to facilitate risk reduction, and “operate as an added 
element that falls under the purview of the medical community.”  The SPPM noted she 
had considered eliminating the regular SPTF meetings due to the success of the Fusion 
Cell meeting, which serves a similar purpose.  The difference between the two bodies, 
however, is the SPTF is more inclusive of multiple installation agencies, whereas the 
Fusion Cell works more with commands.  There was not a forcing function to ensure 
units attended both, so eliminating an unnecessary meeting was a viable consideration.  
The organization has since decided to continue the SPTF meetings.  Summarily, the 
SPPM functions as resource for units on the installation, but including this office in unit 
activities is voluntary.   
The division personnel office provided an overview of the unit’s SP program.  
The unit’s HP/RR/SP policy establishes internal SPPMs at the division and brigade 
levels.  There are also soldiers identified as Master Resilience Trainers (MRTs) from 
division to company level.  There are three characteristics of the unit’s program that 
make it unique from other divisions.  First, this is the only installation that uses the 
previously described Fusion Cell.  Second, the unit leverages the local MTF’s BH 
residents to provide embedded BH care (referred to as “ePsych”) at the unit level.  
Residents are active members of the battalions and provide services for soldiers on-site, 
as opposed to in hospital or clinics.  The use of ePsych greatly decreases the distance 
between the Soldier and assistance and provides first-hand military experience for 
residents.  The Brigades also have Military Family Life Consultants (MFLCs) available 
to provide assistance to soldiers and families. 
Finally, the unit created Lightning Strong, a program that mirrors the Army 
Comprehensive Soldier and Family Fitness (CSF2) Program.  According to a 2012 brief 
on the program, the unit commander makes this program a top priority, aiming to 
“implement the program at all levels within the division as an immediate and enduring 
solution necessary to ensure improvements in HP and RR policies, increase resilience of 
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soldiers, civilians, and family members, and to sustain mission readiness.”  In addition to 
the five dimensions of the Army’s CSF2 program, the unit has also added financial 
fitness as a sixth dimension of resilience.  The Risk Evaluation and Assistance 
Determination Instrument, Version 4 (WARRIOR) (READI-v4 WARRIOR), which is 
similar to the Army’s Soldier Risk Reduction Tool, is a unit-customized tool that leaders 
in this division use to assess soldiers’ risks and mitigation strategies.  The tool is required 
at all levels and the document is destroyed after completion.  The unit’s leadership 
stresses the importance of the program and works to maintain a relevant and creative 
strategy. 
2. Participant Recruitment 
The inclusion criteria for uniformed participants were rank and unit of 
assignment.  Those allowed to participate were ranks E1 (Private) through O8 (Major 
General) and had to be assigned to the division.  All participants had to be able to speak 
and read English. There are no demographics or previous experiences that would 
disqualify a respondent from participation.  The researcher took the proper precautions 
and informed leaders that the participants would have ready access to key mental health 
resources and be escorted to these resources if necessary.  The interview could also be 
terminated if a subject had a grossly negative reaction to the interview questions.  
C. MATERIAL 
1. Interview Questions 
The overarching research question was: is there a mismatch between the needs of 
the users and the ASPP resources as a result of the system design?  The interview 
questions were formulated into three groups: an examination of user needs, an assessment 
of the three different system interfaces, and an evaluation of overall system functionality.  
Some questions were in survey format, allowing users to pick from a set of pre-
determined responses, and others were open-ended (see Appendix E).  In every interview, 
users were given the opportunity to comment on what they thought the system did the 
best, what needed the most improvement, and any additional areas they wanted to 
discuss.  Figure 14 shows the final list of interview questions, categorized into sections.   
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When discussing a specific path to care once an individual requested help or was 
identified as needing help, the researcher asked participants to think aloud as they 
navigated through the system and recommended solutions from their perspective.  These 
responses were used to conduct a link analysis and develop a diagram of the process.  
Being able to hear how each user cognitively processed each decision was key to finding 
out what works and what does not.   
 
Figure 14.  Interview Questions by Category 
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2. Analysis Tools 
The equipment and analysis tools used for this study were minimal.  The consent 
forms, data sheets, and response sheets were printed in advance of the interviews.  The 
interviewer used a DM500 digital voice recorder to record the interviews and assist in 
note transcription.  A Dell Precision MA300 was used to back up recordings during 
transcription.  The SPPM provided the Army Suicide Prevention Leaders Guide 
(Appendix F) that was given to participants at the conclusion of the interviews.  The 
researcher conducted initial distribution and statistical analysis using Microsoft Excel and 
JMP Pro 9.  A MacBook Air computer was used for all data analysis.   
D. PROCEDURES 
The interviews were conducted one-on-one and in a private setting, with the 
researcher in civilian business attire.  The consent process and interview took 
approximately 30 minutes per respondent.  Participants were informed the discussion 
would include some sensitive questions about stress, mental state, and suicide and they 
could terminate the interview if they felt uncomfortable at any time.  The researcher 
informed participants she would terminate the research study if she felt the topics 
discussed caused unnecessary stress or anxiety.  The researcher also requested to follow-
up with subjects via email or phone within a week of the interview.  The tasks 
accomplished in chronological order were:  
 Researcher reviewed background information and purpose of study  
 Participants provided consent 
 Completion of survey questions 
 Completion of open-ended questions 
 Researcher provided SP pamphlets and requested to follow up with the 
subject.   
 Researcher followed up when necessary 
E. LIMITATIONS 
There were two limitations to the data collection aspect of this study.  First, the 
sample size was small and did not allow for inferential statistical data analysis.  This 
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resulted from a combination of the amount of time available to complete the interviews 
and limited manpower.   The researcher conducted as many as possible over the course of 
a week and the maximum number that could be accomplished each day was limited by 
the interviewer’s schedule and the organization’s mission requirements.  From the 
perspective of gathering qualitative feedback, which was the focus of this study, the 24 
participants provided more than enough data for an efficient data collection process.  
Future variations of this research should include more manpower and allocate sufficient 
time to ensure a much larger sample size. 
The second limitation was the existence of this unit’s program as a microcosm of 
the larger ASPP system, not a replica.  The research team could draw conclusions about 
the execution of the system across the Army, but only make comparisons between the 
understanding of the theoretical system construct identified in Chapter II and the 
assessments given by those interviewed.  The next Chapter will detail this comparison in 
order to answer the four research questions.  All analysis and discussion should be 
viewed as the researcher’s analysis and interpretation of the soldiers’ perspectives in this 
particular unit and the background research conducted for this study.  
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V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
A. PARTICIPANTS 
Twenty-four soldiers volunteered to participate in this study.  Figure 15 shows the 
demographic distributions of the sample.  The participants were highly diverse in Army 
experience and job positions.  Out of the 24 participants, 13 were enlisted soldiers, nine 
were officers, and two were warrant officers.  Eight participants were non-commissioned 
officers (NCOs).  Six participants were females and 18 were males.  The participants’ 
ages ranged from 20 to 45, with mean and standard deviation 33.6 and 8.2 years.  The 
participants’ Time in Service (TIS) ranged from six months to 27 years, with mean and 
standard deviation 11.7 and 8.1 years.  Two participants reported a family history of 
suicide, while 16 reported personal experience with suicide or a suicidal person.   
B. ANALYTICAL METHOD 
There were two main analytical methods employed for this analysis: distribution 
analysis and qualitative analysis.  All questions, regardless of type, were analyzed by 
reviewing the distribution of the answers.  In order to accomplish this, a pre-determined 
set of categories was created for each open-ended question.  The categories used for the 
survey questions were those answer options given to the participants.  Although optimal 
analysis would have included the appropriate statistical tests, the number of responses 
could not meet the assumptions and conditions for these.   
The following sections present the results of the interviews by describing the 
intent of the questions (and expected outcomes, if applicable), the general distribution of 
the answers, comparisons of answers between demographics, and some of additional 
information gathered from open-ended answers.  For the purposes of this analysis, the 
“Career” category was constructed to allow 8 participants in each level, using the 
following breakdown: “Junior” included ages 20—34 years, TIS 6 months—9 years; 
“Mid-Grade” included ages 28—45 years, TIS 9—16 years; and “Senior” included 37—




Figure 15.  Distribution of Participant Demographic Information 
C. RESULTS 
1. User Needs Questions 
The first set of questions was related to the needs of system users, particularly 
soldiers.  The goal was to determine how soldiers ranked the four needs identified in the 
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protection.  The current focus of the Army’s SP training and strategic messages focused 
on active buddy care and risk reduction.  Engaged leadership is noted in policy as a 
necessary aspect of a successful program, however that need is more understood than 
directly addressed in strategic communications about suicide prevention when compared 
to the other topics.  Figure 16 shows the distribution of responses for the most important 
of the four needs. 
 
Figure 16.  Number and Types of Responses to Most Important Need 
Engaged leadership was ranked highest by 38 percent of the respondents.  
Increased protection was ranked most important by 33 percent of the participants.  Active 
buddy care and risk reduction were the bottom two ranked highest at 17 percent and 13 
percent, respectively.  Engaged leadership was the highest need for 38 percent of the 
enlisted participants.  Among the officers, 33 percent listed engaged leadership and 33 
percent listed increased protection.  Between the two warrant officers, one selected 
engaged leadership and one selected increased protection.  Half of the female participants 
identified increased protection as the top need, whereas the most important need among 
males was engaged leadership.  Junior, mid-grade, and senior participants selected 
engaged leadership or increased protection as the top need most often.  Active buddy care 
and risk reduction was not the most important need for any category, or in total.  
The interviewer asked Question 1 by handing participants four cards, one with 







9 4 8 3
Officer 3 2 3 1
Warrant Officer 1 ‐ 1 ‐
Enlisted 5 2 4 2
Male 7 3 5 3
Female 2 1 3 ‐
Junior 2 2 3 1
Mid‐Grade 4 2 2 ‐
Senior 3 ‐ 3 2
Career
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digest the information and set the cards out in order of most important to least important.  
Some soldiers thought they had an answer very quickly by looking at the title.  As some 
laid the cards out, they realized they had not read what the topic included and made the 
necessary adjustments.  Specifically, some gave more attention to increased protection as 
time went on and moved it higher or lower based on their preference.  Some knew 
instantly they wanted to list engaged leadership first no matter what was on the other 
cards.   
Participants also made the following summarized comments about SP needs: 
 The buddy is probably the most important—the first person a Soldier will 
turn to is their buddy, not a slide or video. (male officer) 
 In the military we always push the buddy system and stress we can’t work 
if we are not a cohesive team.  (female NCO) 
 You have to put out the fire first.  If you don’t reduce the risk (like PTSD), 
no matter how much leadership you have if that is still there, this is not 
going to help.  (male NCO) 
 If you want to kill yourself, the risks are the things that are going to make 
you want to. Your leadership is not going to make you want to.  If you 
have pain or PTSD, that’s what going to put you in that place.  If you can 
deal with those you are much better off.  (male soldier) 
Figure 17 shows the participants’ distribution of explanations as to why suicide 
events are not detected early.  Participants were not given answer options, but their 
answers were grouped appropriately during analysis.  Most participants (29 percent) 
identified the main reason suicide events are not detected early is because the signs are 
not recognized.  When asked why this was the case, responses centered around the 
isolated environment that many soldiers live in, either because of their workload, 
domicile location, personal space preference, or lack of caring.  Lack of leader 
involvement was identified by 21 percent of participants.  The next two categories 
identified by 29 percent of participants combined were either soldiers not getting or not 
offering help.  For these two categories, some determined this could be the result of an 
organizationally or self-imposed stigma.   Other reasons were identified that did not fit 
into the aforementioned categories.   
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Figure 17.  Numbers and Types of Responses to Reasons Suicide Events are not 
Detected Early 
The most frequently identified reason among officers and males was signs not 
being recognized, with responses being 83 percent and 27 percent respectively.  The 
enlisted responses were somewhat evenly distributed between the four categories.  The 
majority of responses from female participants were between lack of leader involvement 
and signs not being recognized.  Fifty percent of senior participants said the main reason 
was signs not being recognized, while 38 percent of junior participants said soldiers do 
not offer help and 38 percent of mid-grade participants said lack of leader involvement.  
In general, most confirmed that soldiers are trained on what to look for, but that did not 
mean the detection actually happened.  Some of the enlisted participants said they could 
be more informed on what signs to look for.  
Participants also made the following summarized comments about detecting a 
Soldier needs help: 
 People don’t care.  We just do our routine. The office is a routine.  If they 
do think something is wrong they don’t want to be the ones to approach 
them.  (female officer) 
 Signs are hard to notice, if you are too close to the person you are not 
going to see the signs, and that’s where the first line and second line 
supervisors have to be able to look down into their ranks and see the signs.  
(male officer) 
 We treat our animals way better than we treat our soldiers.  You see 
people stop for animals who have been hit, but how many times do we see  
 
 










5 7 4 3 5 ‐
Officer 2 5 ‐ 1 1 ‐
Warrant Officer ‐ ‐ 1 ‐ 1 ‐
Enlisted 3 2 3 2 3 ‐
Male 3 5 4 2 4 ‐
Female 2 2 ‐ 1 1 ‐
Junior 1 1 1 3 2 ‐
Mid‐Grade 3 2 1 ‐ 2 ‐






Question 2.  What do you think is the main reason suicide events are not detected early? 
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a Soldier who is mentally or physically wounded, but we walk right by 
them because we don’t want to be the cause of them doing something rash 
or harming them in any way.  (female NCO) 
 It is hard to detect because the environment that we are in today breeds 
isolation.  From our barracks, the closing of the chow hall, no intramurals, 
etc.  Even organizational days, thank God they are coming back.  (female 
officer) 
 We have gotten further and further away from our leaders being on duty 
24 hours a day. It’s the nature of what has happened to us in the last 12 
years, it is not an excuse but it is a cause.  You send someone down range 
for 15 months and then they come home.  We are the kind of Army where 
we are on or off now.  There are a lot of soldiers who don’t live on post 
and they go home and turn if off—kind of like they work at Wal-Mart.  
The ones who live in the barracks, it’s not as easy to turn it off.  I think it 
will get better as we return to a garrison environment and more will turn it 
on.  It’s natural you want to turn it off that first two or three months.  My 
first deployment to Afghanistan was 451 days.  Everyone know it’s a 24-
hour responsibility as leaders, but it’s harder to execute based on what we 
have been asked to do the last couple of years.  (male officer) 
 The Army is not a team anymore.  If you watch Nijmegen, the Americans 
are the only ones who start as a group and finish as individuals.  (female 
NCO) 
The third question in this section was whether or not there was a stigma 
associated with seeking help for BH issues.  A vast majority (75 percent) of the 
participants answered this question positively (see Figure 18).  Only one person said he 
did not know.  During the conversation surrounding this question, some said the stigma 
was actually high and some said it was lower than it used to be.  The positive response to 
this question was the majority answer across all ranks and genders.   
Interestingly, some went on to elaborate that the stigma existed based on the unit 
type or particular leaders within a unit.  When this was presented, the interviewer re-
asked the question by asking if the participant thought there was a stigma associated with 
seeking help in some organizations, but not the Army as a whole in order to ensure the 
participants’ response was clear.  
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Figure 18.  Number and Types of Responses to Whether a Stigma Exists 
Participants also made the following summarized comments about the stigma: 
 There is a stigma if the unit knows and it’s publicized and not kept 
confidential.  (male officer) 
 When you’re in a platoon, you have to bring in a slip and it says where the 
appointment is.  That’s across the Army.  I feel like every step someone 
has to be notified. Is it fixable? I think the Army Sexual 
Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) Program has a 
great program that is confidential.  (female NCO) 
 If have gone to Behavioral Health before and was always looked down 
upon.  They knew I was going because I had to tell them so I could get off 
work.  (female NCO) 
 I don’t know if there’s a stigma, people just don’t like to talk about.  If 
anything we have created a culture where it should be easier to talk about 
it.  (male NCO) 
 I think we say there is a stigma, but if there was we would be able to walk 
in to Behavioral Health and get an appointment instead of waiting a 
month.  (female officer). 
 Soldiers should be able to express themselves without repercussions.  
That’s the problem with the stigma—people think it will affect their career 
or the higher chain of command will look down on them.  (male soldier) 
 Of course in the Infantry it’s worse.  There’s no sympathy.  If you have a 
bad day no one in your unit actually cares.  It’s the attitude of this job to 
be the best.  Unless a Platoon Sergeant steps in to address it outside of 
work, but everyone else—it’s not their job to care, it’s their job make you 
get past that.  If you’re going to be Infantry you should have some extra  
 
 
Yes No Other I Don't Know
18 5 ‐ 1
Officer 6 3 ‐ ‐
Warrant Officer 2 ‐ ‐ ‐
Enlisted 10 2 ‐ 1
Male 14 3 ‐ 1
Female 4 2 ‐ ‐
Junior 7 ‐ ‐ 1
Mid‐Grade 6 2 ‐ ‐






Question 3.  Is there a stigma associated with seeking help?
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test when you enlist to make sure you are able to handle when something 
goes bad and say “I need to talk to someone,” instead of wondering if you 
should tell your buddy.  (male soldier) 
 There is a stigma with reaching out to offer help, not just asking for help. 
(female officer) 
 I’ve never seen anyone ask for help then have negative repercussions 
follow them. I’ve seen people move units due to problems like that but it 
did not affect their career.  (male soldier) 
 Yes there is a stigma, but its not as high as it used to be.  I think we have 
made improvements in that area, but I’m not sure how much. Sometimes I 
wonder if we talk about it too much, even to the point where in many 
respects we have normalized.  Maybe some now see suicide as an option, 
I’m not sure.  You wonder why our numbers are still as they are with all 
the resources.  (male officer) 
 Some soldiers identify so much with the pride of their unit and the history 
of their unit that they are not going to allow themselves to be weak at all. 
It’s different in the support battalions, they don’t care, but not if you’re 
Infantry or Field Artillery.  (female NCO) 
 Yes, especially now as we have just told our Army we are reducing by 
100,000.  We are looking for reasons to send people home.  If you and I 
are average performers and you have multiple suicide issues and I don’t, if 
you’re a not like the others and you have a problem, you just volunteered 
to go.  So some think, “I don’t want to give anyone a reason to let me go.  
If it gets out that I have issues, I might be one of the ones that gets targeted 
to go home.”  I don’t think that’s true, but that’s part of it.  (male officer) 
 The stigma is high primarily because with a person who gets to that point, 
there are so many other things going on (UCMJ, Chapter, PTSD, 
malingering).  You have Company Commanders and First Sergeants who 
say they are just using this as a way out or crutch.  That’s true for some, 
not for everybody.  (male officer) 
The conclusions drawn from this section of questions are: 
 The two highest needs ranked as the most important by most participants, 
engaged leadership and increased protection, were those focused the least 
on by current training programs.   
 Soldiers understand what warning signs are associated with suicide, but 
felt the main reason they were not detected early was because soldiers did 




 Most participants felt there is a stigma associated with seeking help, but 
felt it is based on the organization and its leaders, not a phenomenon 
supported by the Army.  There was not a collective answer as to whether 
or not the stigma could be eliminated. 
2. Physical Interfaces Questions 
The set of questions on the physical interfaces was an assessment of various SP 
messages and resources delivered via the Internet, pamphlets, manuals, and posters (see 
Appendix E).  Of the 26 items presented, Figure 19 shows the breakdown of how many 
were recognized and used.  The majority of participants (54 percent) were familiar with 
fewer than five items and 79 percent of participants knew ten or fewer of the resources 
presented.  It is important to note those who recognized the most were officers; the only 
participant who was familiar with more than 20 of the resources was a female senior 
Human Resources officer.   
 
Figure 19.  Number and Types of Responses to Resource Recognition 
All participants concluded this section by assessing their knowledge of the 
program’s resources as poor; this assessment was unprompted.  Some even went on to 
say they had learned about the program just by going through the list of items.  Most 
participants went on to say they wished they had known more.  
Participants were asked to rate the usefulness of the resources they were familiar 
with.  Figure 20 shows the breakdown of the number of resources that received each 
0‐5 6‐10 11‐15 16‐20 20‐26
13 6 3 1 1
Officer 1 4 2 1 1
Warrant Officer 2 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Enlisted 10 2 1 ‐ ‐
Male 11 5 1 1 ‐
Female 2 1 2 ‐ 1
Junior 6 1 1 ‐ ‐
Mid‐Grade 4 2 1 1 ‐







Question 4.  How many of the following resources have you seen and used?
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rating.  Most resources were rated as extremely useful or extremely not useful.  Of those 
who were familiar with the fewest number of these resources, they gave “useful” ratings 
47 percent of the time.  Those who knew 6—10 of the resources gave almost equal 
numbers of “neither useful, nor not useful,” “useful,” and “extremely useful” ratings.  
Among the three people who knew between 11—15 resources, “extremely useful” ratings 
were given 49 percent of the time.  The one individual who knew 17 resources said most 
of the resources were neither useful, nor not useful.  The one individual who was familiar 
with the most gave 67 percent of the resources a “not useful at all” rating.  One officer 
noted the ASPP website was the best site for the topic, but most generally were 
unfamiliar with it. 
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Figure 20.  Number and Types of Responses Usefulness of those Resources Recognized 
Participants made the following summarized comments about the resources 
presented: 
 There is no follow-up with the GAT.  (female NCO) 
 Not everyone answers the GAT honestly because its boring or doesn’t 
apply to them.  (male soldier) 










51 1 3 10 24 12 1
Officer 5 ‐ ‐ 2 2 1 ‐
Warrant Officer 5 ‐ ‐ 2 2 1 ‐
Enlisted 41 1 3 6 20 10 1
Male 41 1 3 8 19 9 1
Female 10 ‐ ‐ 2 5 3 ‐
Junior 24 1 3 5 9 5 1
Mid‐Grade 15 ‐ ‐ ‐ 12 3 ‐
Senior 12 ‐ ‐ 5 3 4 ‐
51 2 4 15 13 14 3
Officer 33 2 3 10 9 9 ‐
Warrant Officer ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Enlisted 18 ‐ 1 5 4 5 3
Male 42 2 3 14 11 12 ‐
Female 9 ‐ 1 1 2 2 3
Junior 9 ‐ ‐ 4 2 3 ‐
Mid‐Grade 15 1 2 4 6 2 ‐

















17 ‐ 1 8 5 3 ‐
Officer 17 ‐ 1 8 5 3 ‐
Warrant Officer ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Enlisted ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Male 17 ‐ 1 8 5 3 ‐
Female ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Junior ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Mid‐Grade 17 ‐ 1 8 5 3 ‐
Senior ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
21 14 ‐ 4 ‐ 3 ‐
Officer 21 14 ‐ 4 ‐ 3 ‐
Warrant Officer ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Enlisted ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Male ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Female 21 14 ‐ 4 ‐ 3 ‐
Junior ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Mid‐Grade ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
















 Where does the GAT go after we take it?  It’s going to tell you have a 
problem, but no one is going to know if you have a problem. (female 
officer) 
 There are a lot of resources here that need to be put out.  A lot of soldiers 
are not very truthful about the GAT, but it makes them aware.  (male 
soldier) 
 The best part about the program is the “Shoulder to Shoulder” video.  
(male officer). 
The conclusions drawn from this section are: 
 Most participants were not familiar with a majority of the resources. 
 The GAT was not widely accepted as effective.   
 Some participants felt there were some resources that seemed to provide 
the same service. 
 The variation of the Army’s Soldier Risk Reduction Tool created by this 
particular unit was identified as familiar and useful by some participants, 
however the Army’s version of this tool was not.   
3. Human Interfaces Questions 
This section allowed participants to assess the helpfulness of various human 
interfaces, to include people, medical, and religious services.  The participants were 
asked to assess the usefulness based on their experience or that of others they know.  
Figure 21 shows the distribution of these answers.   
The assessment given by the majority of participants for each resource was as 
follows (how many gave this rating is in parentheses): Spouse—Helpful (11), Other 
Family—Helpful (13), Friend—Extremely Helpful (13), Army BH—Extremely Helpful 
(11), Chaplain/church—Helpful (16), Supervisor—Helpful (14), External Source—
Extremely Helpful (10), Unit ASIST—Helpful (10), Unit MRT—Helpful (9).   
The only categories that received negative assessments were as follows (how 
many gave this rating is in parentheses): Spouse—Extremely Not Helpful (1) and Not 
Helpful (2), Army BH—Extremely Unhelpful (1), Other Family—Not Helpful (1), 
Supervisor—Not Helpful (1), External Source—Not Helpful (2).  The only category that 
did not receive negative ratings was Chaplain/church. 
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During each interview, participants were asked if they could name a particular 
resource they knew from theirs or someone else’s experience that actually worked.  The 
responses were as follows (some gave more than two answers): Military/Army 
OneSource—5, Chaplains—4, engaged leaders—3, family and friends—5, telephonic 
hotlines—1, BH—1, MFLCs—1, ACS—1.   
Participants made the following summarized comments about people and 
resources that provide help for those with suicidal thoughts: 
 The soldiers who were talked to by Chaplain, the First Sergeant, or a 
mentor—someone they knew cared about them—they got better and were 
not behavioral issues in the unit.  The soldiers who went to BH either 
declined or got irrational, they never got better.  BH will listen to you talk, 
but there is not validation or problem solving skill sets that are thrown out 
there.  It’s more of a sounding board.  They are not allowed to give 
solutions, but all the people in group therapy do.  The psychiatrists, 
psychologists, and social workers can ask questions to help you think, but 
I’m not real impressed with Behavioral Health.  (female NCO) 
 MFLC see just as many individual soldiers now as they do families. We 
have an MFLC who is a trained clinical psychiatrist and is absolutely 
fantastic. The last one we had was like 65, so no one would talk to her. 
(male officer) 
 The follow-on is where we have an issue and it is even more complicated 
if the Soldier is going to PCS.  No one wants to put a flag on a Soldier to 
stabilize them.  We put too much of a price on privacy for those who need 




Figure 21.  Number and Type of Responses for Usefulness of Various People/Resources 
Extremely 






Unhelpful Unhelpful Neither Helpful
Extremely 
Helpful No Opinion
1 2 2 11 7 1 1 1 2 14 5 1
Officer ‐ 2 ‐ 4 2 1 Officer 1 ‐ ‐ 8 ‐ ‐
Warrant Officer ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 2 ‐ Warrant 
Officer
‐ ‐ ‐ 1 1 ‐
Enlisted 1 ‐ 2 7 3 ‐ Enlisted ‐ 1 2 5 4 1
Male 1 1 2 9 4 1 Male 1 1 2 9 4 1
Female ‐ 1 ‐ 2 3 ‐ Female 5 1
Junior 1 1 1 2 3 Junior 1 4 2 1
Mid‐Grade 1 5 2 Mid‐Grade 1 5 2
Senior 1 4 2 1 Senior 1 1 5 1
‐ 1 3 13 7 ‐ ‐ 2 1 8 10 3
Officer ‐ 1 ‐ 5 3 ‐ Officer ‐ 1 1 5 2
Warrant Officer ‐ ‐ ‐ 1 1 ‐ Warrant 
Officer
‐ 1 1
Enlisted ‐ ‐ 3 7 3 ‐ Enlisted ‐ 1 3 7 2
Male ‐ ‐ 3 10 5 ‐ Male ‐ 1 1 5 8 3
Female ‐ 1 ‐ 3 2 ‐ Female ‐ 1 3 2
Junior 1 1 3 3 Junior 1 2 4 1
Mid‐Grade 1 4 3 Mid‐Grade 1 2 4 1
Senior 1 6 1 Senior 1 4 2 1
‐ ‐ 1 10 13 ‐ ‐ ‐ 2 10 7 5
Officer ‐ ‐ ‐ 2 7 ‐ Officer ‐ ‐ 2 5 2
Warrant Officer ‐ ‐ ‐ 1 1 ‐ Warrant 
Officer
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1 1
Enlisted ‐ ‐ 1 7 5 ‐ Enlisted ‐ ‐ ‐ 5 4 4
Male ‐ ‐ 1 8 9 ‐ Male ‐ ‐ 2 6 6 4
Female ‐ ‐ ‐ 2 4 ‐ Female ‐ ‐ ‐ 4 1 1
Junior 6 2 Junior 4 2 2
Mid‐Grade 2 6 Mid‐Grade 2 2 2 2
Senior 1 2 5 Senior 4 3 1
1 ‐ 2 8 11 2 ‐ ‐ 4 9 6 5
Officer 1 ‐ ‐ 4 4 ‐ Officer ‐ ‐ 3 5 1
Warrant Officer ‐ ‐ ‐ 1 ‐ 1 Warrant 
Officer
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1 1
Enlisted ‐ ‐ 2 3 7 1 Enlisted ‐ ‐ 1 4 4 4
Male ‐ ‐ ‐ 6 10 2 Male ‐ ‐ 3 6 4 5
Female 1 ‐ 2 2 1 ‐ Female ‐ ‐ 1 3 2 ‐
Junior 1 1 2 3 1 Junior 5 1 2
Mid‐Grade 6 2 Mid‐Grade 3 3 2
Senior 1 6 1 Senior 1 4 2 1
‐ ‐ ‐ 7 16 1
Officer ‐ ‐ ‐ 3 6 ‐
Warrant Officer ‐ ‐ ‐ 1 1 ‐
Enlisted ‐ ‐ ‐ 3 9 1
Male ‐ ‐ ‐ 5 12 1
Female ‐ ‐ ‐ 2 4 ‐
























































As a part of this section, soldiers were asked if they knew the ASIST and MRT 
trained personnel in their unit.  As shown in Figure 22, 58 percent of participants knew 
who both were in their unit, while 33 percent did not know either.  The majority of those 
who knew neither were junior enlisted.  The majority of those who knew both were 
senior officers; half of the female participants knew both.   
 
Figure 22.  Number and Types of Responses to Knowledge of  
Unit MRT/ASIST Personnel 
The final part of this section asked participants to assess confidence in their 
ability to recognize and intervene if a Soldier needs help.  Figure 23 shows the results for 
confidence in recognizing and Figure 24 shows the results for confidence in actually 
intervening.  Half of the participants felt very confident in their ability to recognize a 
Soldier needed help.  The second most frequently given response was somewhat 
confident.  All but one individual felt very confident in their ability to intervene if a 
Soldier needed help.   
MRT & ASIST MRT Only ASIST Only Neither
14 2 ‐ 8
Officer 8 ‐ ‐ 1
Warrant Officer 1 1 ‐ ‐
Enlisted 5 1 ‐ 7
Male 11 1 ‐ 6
Female 3 1 ‐ 2
Junior 3 1 4










Figure 23.  Number and Types of Responses to Confidence in  
Recognizing a Need for Help 
A female NCO made the following summarized comment about intervening when 
a Soldier needs help: If they are not your soldiers you better not say anything.  Infantry 
soldiers are very protective of soldiers in their squad.  
 
Figure 24.  Number and Types of Responses to Confidence in Intervention Ability 
The conclusions drawn from this section are: 
 Although there was a high level of confidence to recognize and intervene 
if a Soldier needed help, most felt this was only for other soldiers with 
which they had daily interaction or personal relationships.   
 The majority of those who did not know their unit MRT or ASIST trained 
personnel were enlisted. 
 Participants were significantly more confident in their ability to intervene 




Confident Confident Very Confident Other I Don't Know
3 7 2 12 ‐ ‐
Officer 1 2 1 5 ‐ ‐
Warrant Officer 1 1 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Enlisted 1 4 1 7 ‐ ‐
Male 1 6 1 9 ‐ ‐
Female 2 1 1 3 ‐ ‐
Junior 2 2 4 ‐ ‐
Mid‐Grade 2 3 ‐ 3 ‐ ‐












Confident Other I Don't Know
‐ ‐ 1 23 ‐ ‐
Officer ‐ ‐ 1 12 ‐ ‐
Warrant Officer ‐ ‐ ‐ 2 ‐ ‐
Enlisted ‐ ‐ ‐ 9 ‐ ‐
Male ‐ ‐ ‐ 18 ‐ ‐
Female ‐ ‐ 1 5 ‐ ‐
Junior ‐ ‐ 8 ‐ ‐
Mid‐Grade ‐ ‐ 1 7 ‐ ‐





Question 9.   How confident are you that you would intervene if a Soldier/buddy needed help?
Answers
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4. System Interfaces Questions 
The section on system interfaces focused on suicide prevention training.  As the 
primary means for providing system users information on what services are available and 
how they can assist themselves and others, SP training is extremely important for the 
effectiveness of the entire system.  In general, SP training guidelines and packages are 
pushed down from the Department of the Army and the execution of the training is 
dictated at the unit level.  The size, media type, and training leader are the main aspects 
of training execution.  Additionally, the Army mandates a SP Stand Down for one day in 
support of Army Suicide Prevention Month in September.  During the Stand Down, 
commanders receive more specific guidance on the training to be conducted, such as 
themes and videos.   
In response to the question on preferences for training execution, the most 
preferred type was discussion-based training led by a senior NCO and conducted in 
groups smaller than company size.  As shown in Figures 25 and 26, there was little to no 
support for the training execution styles that most of the respondents had participated in 
previously.  No participant preferred battalion-sized or one-on-one training.  For sizes 
smaller than battalion, the preferences were: company—25 percent, platoon—33 percent, 
and squad/section 33 percent.  Within the enlisted respondents, the majority preferred 
company sized training.  Some respondents noted the importance of establishing trust if 
training is to generate discussion and felt in smaller groups this would be easier if the 
groups were homogenized for rank categories.  There was one officer who had enjoyed 
training during which the participants were divided into groups: one for senior NCOs and 
one for officers. 
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Figure 25.  Number and Types of Responses to Group Size Preference 
Only two of the four options for media type were selected by anyone, with 75 
percent preferring discussion and 21 percent preferring videos.  
 
Figure 26.  Number and Types of Responses to Media Type Preference 
As shown in Figure 27, none of the respondents preferred a senior officer as the 
training facilitator, however 46 percent preferred a senior NCO to lead the training and 
21 percent preferred the Chaplain.  Only the majority of Officers did not favor Senior 
NCOs as facilitators over the other options.  No specific reasons for this came up during 
the discussion.  Two recommendations for the “Other” category were the Army 
Community Services (ACS) Representative and joint instruction by the unit Commander 
or First Sergeant and a battalion ASIST-trained senior officer. 
Battalion Company Platoon Squad/
Section
1‐on‐1 Other
‐ 6 8 8 ‐ 2
Officer ‐ 1 4 3 ‐ 1
Warrant Officer ‐ ‐ ‐ 2 ‐ ‐
Enlisted ‐ 5 4 3 ‐ 1
Male ‐ 4 6 8 ‐ ‐
Female ‐ 2 2 ‐ ‐ 2
Junior ‐ 3 3 2 ‐ ‐
Mid‐Grade ‐ 3 3 2 ‐ ‐






Question 10.  Which of the following group sizes do you prefer for suicide prevention training?
Powerpoint Online Video Discussion Other
‐ ‐ 5 18 1
Officer ‐ ‐ 1 7 1
Warrant Officer ‐ ‐ 1 1 ‐
Enlisted ‐ ‐ 3 10 ‐
Male ‐ ‐ 4 14 ‐
Female ‐ ‐ 1 4 1
Junior ‐ ‐ 1 6 1
Mid‐Grade ‐ ‐ 3 5 ‐






Question 11.  Which of the following media types do you prefer for suicide prevention training?
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Figure 27.  Number and Types of Responses to Training Facilitator Preference 
Participants made the following summarized comments about training execution: 
 Methods of mass training, like this online survey, are not good.  There are 
so many that you aim to click through PowerPoint quickly.  Any type of 
self-paced training is not effective.  (female officer) 
 Training should be more often, if I arrive to a unit and they did it last week 
that’s three more quarters until I will get the training.  So every quarter is 
better than every year.  (male soldier) 
 The skits work because soldiers actually put themselves in there.  
Watching a video, you can’t beat the game.  The ACE one was interactive 
so they played along with it. The only way to get them involved is to beat 
the game or put them in front of a role-playing skit.  (female NCO) 
 Any training that is only through AKO and a CAC is difficult at best 
because soldiers don’t all sit down to a computer with CAC.  A company 
may only be using two computers.  Why do we continue to put online 
training as CAC only.  Just put it on a Website or a mobile device.  (male 
officer) 
As identified in the HTA, a primary focus of the Army’s SP training strategy is 
gatekeeper training, through the use of buddy care.  When asked whether they thought 
training should focus more on buddy care, more on self-care, or an equal amount of both, 
the 50 percent of the respondents supported an equal amount of both (see Figure 28).  
The second most popular preference was a focus on more buddy care at 33 percent.  Mid-
grade participants only selected more buddy or equal amounts, while 50 percent each of 
junior and senior participants preferred equal amounts. 
Senior Officer Senior NCO 
Commander/
First Sergeant Chaplain Other
‐ 11 3 5 5
Officer ‐ 2 1 3 3
Warrant Officer ‐ 1 1 ‐ ‐
Enlisted ‐ 8 1 2 2
Male ‐ 8 3 4 3
Female ‐ 3 ‐ 1 2
Junior ‐ 4 ‐ 3 1
Mid‐Grade ‐ 3 2 2 1
Senior ‐ 4 ‐ 3 1
Career






Participants made the following summarized comments about training focus 
topics:  
 There needs to be emphasis on both (buddy care and self-care), right now 
it’s more on buddy care because of the ACE card.  That’s all I see in the 
PowerPoint’s.  (male soldier)  
 I am not sure you can train resiliency as well as we think we can.  It’s a lot 
more of a mental thing, it’s not going to a rifle range.  I think there are 
some people who are predisposition to be more depressed and an hour 
class will not fix that.  They require a much deeper level of care.  (male 
officer) 
 I think there is a lot more “take care of your buddy” in the Army than 
“take care of yourself.” (female officer) 
 
Figure 28.  Number and Type of Responses to Training Focus Preference 
Finally, the interviewer asked respondents to give an assessment of SP Stand 
Downs.  Figure 29 shows half of the respondents’ answers indicated the Stand Downs 
were below standard.  Conversely, 38 percent felt the training met the standard.  This 
assessment was further analyzed to identify those who felt Stand Downs met the 
standard, but went on to identify ways the Stand Downs could be improved; 21 percent 
said the training met the standard but could be better and 17 percent said the training met 
the standard as is.  There were three respondents (13 percent) who said they did not 
know.  Out of all the discussion on Stand Downs, four participants said it was a reason to 
get off work early, three described them as “check the block,” and two said it was “death 
by PowerPoint.” 
More Buddy More Self Equal Other I don't know
8 2 12 2 ‐
Officer 3 1 5 ‐ ‐
Warrant Officer 1 1 ‐ ‐ ‐
Enlisted 4 ‐ 7 2 ‐
Male 7 1 9 1 ‐
Female 1 1 3 1 ‐
Junior 2 ‐ 4 1 ‐
Mid‐Grade 4 ‐ 4 ‐ ‐
Senior 1 2 4 1 ‐
Career
Gender






Figure 29.  Number and Types of Responses for SP Stand Down Assessment 
Participants made the following summarized comments about SP Stand Downs: 
 Every day should be Stand Down Day, leaders need to know their soldiers.  
(male officer) 
 If you have an engaged Squad Leader and Platoon Leader who care, you 
don’t need Stand Down Day.  Physical training, the range, that’s teaching 
resiliency by making soldiers who are mentally tough and spiritual. You 
see some units where soldiers have more issues than others and that is a 
direct reflection of the leadership.  (male officer) 
 As long as it does not turned into a check the block session it can be 
effective.  Sitting in the auditorium for two hours is not effective.  Bring in 
people who have been in the situation and have prior experience dealing 
with suicide and do scenarios.  (male NCO) 
 Stand Downs can be effective, most people think they don’t have to go to 
work, but that’s not what it is.  It could be a couple of days, more 
individualized, and smaller training sizes.  The big group doesn’t hurt and 
you catch everybody at one time.  (male soldier) 
 I know very little about it; the last one apparently didn’t stick out.  (Male 
NCO) 
 I think it should happen more often, twice a year.  (male NCO) 
 If there is going to be a class it should be step-by-step signs of what 
people show when they are thinking about suicide.  Most of the classes, 
they talk about what you should do not what to look for.  For most people 
it’s kind of common sense what to do, but not what to look for.  (male 
soldier) 
 I liked it.  There was the grumble, but I thought it showed this is truly a 








Standard I don't know
12 5 4 ‐ 3
Officer 4 2 3 ‐ ‐
Warrant Officer 2 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Enlisted 6 3 1 ‐ 3
Male 9 4 2 ‐ 3
Female 3 1 2 ‐ ‐
Junior 4 1 3
Mid‐Grade 4 4






Question 14.  What is your assessment of Suicide Prevention Stand Downs?
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and videos, I think we got an entire brigade in the auditorium.  From there 
we broke down into smaller groups, with the people I interacted with 
every day.  (female officer) 
 The best training I had was a Chaplain who started the training in 
civilians, he told us his name, talked to us to get our thoughts, like a 
sensing session.  Then after the break he came back in uniform and 
introduced himself as the Chaplain.  It was nice because you knew he had 
the power to take what you said somewhere and he got candid thoughts. 
(female NCO) 
 That one day doesn’t make a difference, what’s going to happen in that 
day? Classes all day long.  I can understand if suicides have happened a 
lot, like we do for safety when there have been two or three accidents in a 
month.  But it’s just check the block to me, death by PowerPoint. I like 
training within the section rather than auditorium because you get nothing 
out of it.  I don’t know if we can make it better; it irritates me. (male 
soldier) 
 It should be done more often, maybe quarterly.  There’s always time, we 
have time to go to lunch. It could take five or 10 minutes.  Equal 
Opportunity is done every quarter, so why not suicide prevention if its just 
as important.  (male NCO) 
The conclusions drawn from this section of questions are: 
 Although they understand more personnel can be trained at once in larger 
groups, soldiers prefer smaller groups for training in order to facilitate 
better discussion and increase trust within the group.   
 Soldiers prefer discussion to the common way of delivering training using 
PowerPoint and videos. 
 Soldiers prefer having a senior NCO or the Chaplain lead the training, as 
opposed to a senior officer. 
 The current focus on buddy care for SP training is widely accepted, but 
some feel there should be just as much focus on self-care. 
 Most respondents did not feel Suicide Prevention Stand Downs were 
valuable. 
5. Overall System Effectiveness Questions 
The final section of questions was on the overall effectiveness of the system.  
Soldiers were asked to describe the process it takes to get a Soldier help and then assess if 
they felt the process was effective or needed improvement.  They were also asked to 
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share their opinions on the best and weakest parts of the program. The majority of 
respondents (75 percent) said the process was effective (see Figure 30).   
 
Figure 30.  Number and Types of Responses to Assessment of the Process to Get Help 
The participants were asked to describe how they would go about getting the 
Soldier help.  As they described the process, the interviewer made note of which 
resources the participants said they would use and in what order.  Parts of the process that 
were or were not preferred were also identified.  Figure 31 diagrams the responses to this 
question, showing how many people listed a resource and in what order.  The connectors 
in bold are the resources identified most often and the connectors underlined are the 
resources some participants felt could be improved or eliminated.  The Chaplain/church 
was most often referenced, while the Spouse or Other Family was not referenced at all for 
this question.  Three participants said the follow-up should be improved.  Two 
participants said buddy watch should be eliminated.  
Could Be 
Improved Effective Other I Don't Know
6 18 ‐ ‐
Officer 3 6 ‐ ‐
Warrant Officer 1 1 ‐ ‐
Enlisted 2 11 ‐ ‐
Male 4 14 ‐ ‐
Female 2 4 ‐ ‐
Junior 2 6 ‐ ‐
Mid‐Grade 1 7 ‐ ‐
Senior 3 5 ‐ ‐
Gender
Career






Figure 31.  Description of the Process to Get a Soldier Help 
It is important to note BH included the providers embedded at the units.  A female 
NCO noted: I get that there are numbers to call, but it is a lot more personal when they 
are at your brigade and they care.  The way I understand the system, I have to go to sick 
call and tell a Physician’s Assistant I am suicidal before I can just go into BH. 
Figures 32 and 33 show the distribution of the responses for the best and weakest 
parts of the ASPP.  The responses for the best part of the program included the overall 
awareness and attention given to the issue, the number of resources available, and 
confidentiality.  Of those three, overall awareness was cited by 58 percent of those who 
participated.  The next most popular answer for best part of the program was the number 
of resources available, which was given by 17 percent of the participants.  One person 
said the confidential nature of the services was the best part.    
Half of the respondents said the training needed the most improvement.  Only 
eight percent said stigma reduction needed the most improvement.  For both questions, 
some gave other responses or did not have an answer.   
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Figure 32.  Number and Types of Responses to the Best Part of the ASPP 
 
Figure 33.  Number and Types of Responses to ASPP Improvement Areas 
Participants made the following summarized comments about the overall 
functionality of the system:  
 We have everything we need; it’s just a matter of tapping into those 
resources for the people who have problems.  It’s a matter of them taking 
the step to identify they have a problem and need help.  (male officer) 
 We should have leader development trips for all the officers, Lieutenants 
and above.  Sit down with them in civilian clothing with stats, numbers, 
charts, spreadsheets, and the trends and where the leadership was when it 
occurred. Let them realize what their peers are doing and what’s working 
and what’s not across the Army and in their units.  That way they realize 
they are either part of the solution or part of the problem. In general, its 
not that they don’t care, but the fear of taking a step and doing the wrong 




Available Confidentiality Other I Don't Know
14 4 1 2 3
Officer 5 1 1 2 ‐
Warrant Officer 2 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Enlisted 7 3 ‐ ‐ 3
Male 10 3 1 2 2
Female 4 1 ‐ ‐ 1
Junior 4 3 ‐ ‐ 1
Mid‐Grade 4 ‐ 1 1 2






Question 16.  What is the best part about the ASPP?
Training Stigma None Other I Don't Know
12 2 1 5 4
Officer 6 ‐ ‐ 2 1
Warrant Officer 1 ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
Enlisted 5 2 1 3 2
Male 9 2 1 2 4
Female 3 ‐ ‐ 3 ‐
Junior 5 ‐ 1 1 1
Mid‐Grade 1 2 ‐ 2 3
Senior 6 ‐ ‐ 2 ‐
Career
Gender





 During the ASIST class, the statistics used were from 2007.  This 
information is no longer relevant.  The units should get more timely 
feedback on DoDSER data.  We should be able to provide relevant and 
timely data and analysis of info quarterly.  We should not be talking about 
suicides from over a year ago.  (female officer) 
 Senior NCOs need to swallow their pride and realize that some people do 
need help.  The NCOs who actually do help you have been through the 
same thing. You can be a man to a point, but being a better man is to 
swallow your pride and say “I need help.”  (male soldier) 
 The best part about the program is inpatient and embedded BH.  The unit 
psychiatrists are actually in the formation doing PT and they can tell when 
something is wrong, whereas most of us are too busy to notice.  (female 
officer) 
 The best part about the program is having ASIST for those who are not 
Behavioral Health professionals.  Ideally, you have Behavioral Health at 
every battalion but that’s not possible.  There’s not enough access or 
professionals at the lower level and the specialized training supplements 
that.  It’s like with the Medics—there’s not enough to take care of all the 
casualties, so we train medical extenders like Combat Life Savers.  They 
might not be able to fix everything, nor should they have to, but they 
should be able to identify risk factors, signs, and symptoms; stabilize what 
they can through ACE; and realize the limits of their capabilities and get 
soldiers to care.  (male officer) 
The conclusions drawn from this section of questions are: 
 There is overwhelming support for improving the program among those 
interviewed.  The majority of the negative comments about the program 
are culturally or organizationally based. 
 SP training garnered more negative feedback than resource availability 
and confidentiality issues.  
 Most felt the stigma associated with getting help has to be addressed by 
the leadership within an organization or the program will continue to have 
issues. 
 Soldiers appreciate the level of effort the Army has put into addressing 
suicide as an issue; some feel these efforts are the best they can be 
considering the nature of the problem and some feel the efforts could be 
more streamlined. 
 Those with institutional knowledge and experience with the ASIST 




For each section of interview questions, the researcher was able to draw general 
conclusions on the different interfaces within the ASPP system.  Those conclusions were 
used to answer the four research questions posed in Chapter II: 
 Is there a mismatch between the resources offered by the ASPP system 
and the needs of the soldiers who use the system? 
 Does the assessment of ASPP system vary between those who have 
previous experience with suicide and those who do not? 
 Is there a difference in system assessments between soldiers of different 
genders and rank categories? 
 Does the stigma associated with help-seeking behavior contribute to risk-
taking behavior? 
Based on the data collected, the research team could only draw conclusions about 
the first and fourth research questions, which are further explained in the following 
sections.  Due to the low sample size and distribution of answers, we could not conclude 
the assessments of the ASPP system significantly varied between those with different 
ranks, genders, and experience with suicide.  A recent article on military SP from the 
Archives of Suicide Research by the International Academy for Suicide Research is 
noteworthy for inclusion in this discussion.  For each of the topics detailed in the next 
sections, insights from this article serve to reiterate those previously mentioned in 
Chapter II and the inferences made by the researcher. 
1. Mismatches between System Resources and User Needs 
The lack of conducting a systematic user needs assessment prior to the 
implementation of the ASPP system was a major indicator that the first research question 
would produce system mismatches.  This prediction was confirmed and the research team 
determined there were mismatches between the system resources and the user needs.  A 
mismatch existed when there was a noted incongruence between the needs identified 
during research and the intended system construct, both outlined in Chapter II.  
Reviewing the conclusions for each section of interview questions, these mismatches 
were translated into four system gaps: 
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a. Training Focus and Format Imbalanced 
The needs users felt were most important (engaged leadership and 
increased protection) and those needs primarily focused on in training (buddy care and 
risk reduction) were incongruent. Background documents establish the four needs 
associated with SP, but the program’s training focuses on only two of these.   Users felt 
the training format was ineffective as it is normally presented.  Soldiers do not prefer the 
format commonly used for training; the use of large groups and PowerPoint decreases 
engagement by participants.    
Bryan et al. (2012) provide a similar explanation for the mismatch in 
training focus:  
Unfortunately, many existing prevention efforts within the military 
training emphasize signs and symptoms of combat stress, PTSD, 
depression, and suicide and encourage the accessing of tertiary care in 
order to manage these.  Basic principles of psychology are rarely used to 
teach service members how to appraise their…experiences as a source of 
growth, or to enhance quality of life on a daily basis.  Basic psychological 
skills training should therefore be injected to foster hardiness and self-
enhancement. ‘Suicide Prevention’ should therefore be re-conceptualized 
not just as avoiding death, but also rather as promoting health and quality 
of life. (pp. 103—104)  
With respect to training format, “the most widely used method for suicide 
awareness education—written lists of warning signs—might not be our most effective 
approach” (Bryan, et al., 2012, p. 105).  Clearly, adjusting the training focus and 
diversifying training methods would be supported by this research. 
b. Buddy Care Limited and Unabated by Self-Care  
The system relies heavily upon the buddy system as a resource, but does 
not ensure this resource is actually provided and used.  Adequate risk detection training is 
provided but inadequate risk detection occurs, which explains soldiers’ higher level of 
confidence in recognizing another soldier needs help, and less confidence in actually 




Soldier-to-Leader interaction may be strained; both issues are exacerbated by a culture of 
isolation.  Most felt self-care is equally important as buddy care, but not fully integrated 
as a part of the ASPP system.   
Here, the juxtaposition between buddy care and self-care challenges one to 
appreciate the value of both and also understand the military culture emphasizes one over 
the other, due in part to the responsibility associated with military service.  Bryan et al. 
(2012) explain: 
Service members who are unable to make rapid decisions to solve 
problems on their own are generally considered to be substandard.  Being 
unable to fix one’s problems therefore poses another threat to the service 
member’s identity; asking for assistance from others violates the military 
culture’s expectation of self-reliance.  Service members can thus become 
trapped within their cultural identity, unable to generate the solutions 
needed to dislodge themselves from their situation.  This trapped position 
is compounded by the problem-solving deterioration that commonly 
occurs during periods of emotional distress, particularly during suicidal 
episodes. (p. 100) 
If soldiers are not provided a program that clearly stresses the need to 
balance between these two forms of care, this type of cultural barrier may continue to 
overshadow the program’s successes in other areas.   
c. Stigma Continues to Increase Needs and Decrease Use of 
Resources 
Destigmatization efforts are inadequate at the user level.  The need for 
engaged leadership and increased protection implies a level of trust and confidentiality 
that currently some feel does not exist, both with leaders and fellow soldiers.  Military 
culture and individual biases facilitate stigma at the unit level, which can decrease use of 
all system resources.  Further, since buddy care is the primary focus of strategic 
communications, the lack of emphasis on self-care could further decrease an individual’s 
ability and/or likeliness to self-treat.  
Another viewpoint of the stigma views it as the outgrowth of the system, 
not just a contributor to the issues therein:  
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Ironically, the structure and design of the mental health system can 
inadvertently serve as a barrier to help-seeking, since mental health 
services are commonly located in medical settings that are geographically 
separated from military units, which can reinforce a deficiency-based 
perspective of mental health that conflicts with the service member’s 
identity of strength, hardiness, and elitism.  Mental health services are 
typically offered during hours that run concurrent with military training 
and duty schedules, thus requiring personnel to leave their unit when it is 
most obvious to their peers.  Military suicide prevention efforts therefore 
need to recognize that traditional, clinical-based care is insufficient itself 
for meeting the needs of the military, and should consider non-traditional 
methods for engaging service members ‘on their turf.’ (Bryan, et al., 2012, 
pp. 99—100) 
d. Awareness of Resources Limited 
Most users surveyed were widely unaware of the SP resources presented.  
Some were also limited in their knowledge of how ASIST and MRT certified personnel 
could assist and who they are.  Of the wide range of resources offered by the system, 
users not in applicable job fields may be unaware of the depth and breadth of resources.  
This shows an obvious disconnect between the system resources and user needs.  A more 
simplified view of this problem is the reality that the average junior soldier demographic 
(whom the Army places extreme emphasis on recognizing as high-risk) may have limited 
knowledge of the ASPP system human and medical resources, a lack of trust in the 
confidentiality of the system, and leaders or buddies who are not engaged enough to 
recognize a possible emergency situation.  In this “worst-case scenario,” he or she may 
turn to the Internet for guidance and be unsure of where to begin to search for 
information.   
Although the level of mobile-Web access is high for most individuals and 
there are posters and cards distributed with ASPP information, knowledge of resources 
has to become second nature across the board in order to address this gap.  Many 
referenced Army OneSource as a resource they knew succeeded in helping to prevent a 
suicide; this service is preferred and well known due to its availability and simplicity.  
Applying the strategic, military approach to the dissemination of resources is key.  
Although Bryan et al. discuss this in terms of SP strategies, it can also be said that SP 
resources should “be specific, concrete, and action-oriented….service members should be 
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told what to do and when to do it, and (critically) be shown how to do it” (Bryan, et al., 
2012, pp. 1).  Resources must be properly advertised, easy to access, and should be given 
the necessary attention for hands-on familiarization during training (particularly if they 
are electronic).    
2. Previous Experience with Suicide 
There were no predictions on differences in user assessments based on levels of 
previous experience with suicide.  The sample was not large enough to determine a 
significant difference between the respondents’ answers.  Despite not being able to draw 
clear parallels between previous experiences with suicide and system assessments, it was 
evident that personal experience made some participants more aware of the topics.   
3. Rank and Gender Differences 
The research team predicted there would be less favorable assessments from those 
with higher ranks due to the system’s focus on buddy aid.  As previously explained, both 
higher and lower ranks provided positive and negative assessments of different aspects of 
the program. Participants with higher rank had more developed opinions about resourcing 
the system and the usefulness of physical interfaces, while those with lower rank had 
more developed opinions about the stigma and training.  The sample was not large 
enough to determine a significant difference between the respondents’ answers based on 
these demographics, however general differences in frequency of responses were detailed 
in the previous sections of this Chapter. 
4. Stigma Continues to Increase Needs and Decrease Use of Resources 
The research team predicted the existence of a stigma would minimize use of the 
system, and therefore contribute to risk-taking behavior.  Higher levels of trust between 
users and implementing controls for confidentiality into the system should result in 
decreasing the stigma.  Some would argue the increased publicizing of high suicide rates 
in the military decreases the stigma associated with help-seeking behavior, while others 
would counter this increase influences others to consider suicide as an option.  On the one 
hand, simply talking about suicide decreases stigma (County of San Diego Health and 
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Human Services Agency (HHSA), 2011).  There was overwhelming support for the 
existence of a stigma and the opinion that this stigma impedes some from seeking help.       
E. SUMMARY 
All feedback gathered provides a clear picture of the user’s system assessment for 
this particular sample within the unit identified.  HSI analyses must relate feedback to 
each of the HSI domains in order to show which domains are most influenced by system 
inefficiencies and ultimately determine where to conduct tradeoffs if system re-design 
occurs.  Table 4 shows how each of the four gaps identified relate to the HSI domains 
explained in Chapter I.  All HSI Domains apply to Gaps 1 and 4, identified in red. 
Table 4.   Mapping Gaps Identified to HSI Domains 
 
Manpower and Personnel domains only applied to Gaps 1 and 4.  The balance 
between Manpower constraints and Personnel KSAs is a regular tradeoff in HSI.  In the 
case of these gaps, there must be consideration for the number and type of personnel 
selected to facilitate and conduct training, specifically unit SP training and ASIST/MRT 
certification.  Training exists as a factor in each gap, therefore this domain applies to all 
gaps identified.  Human Factors Engineering applies to Gaps 1 and 4 as a result of the 
dependence on automation and Web-based systems for training and dissemination of SP 
resources.  Increased stress on the users due to Gaps 2 and 3 is the primary Health Hazard 
concern.  Due to the possible outcomes if suicide events are not prevented, all gaps have 
Safety and Soldier Survivability implications.  
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The diversity of backgrounds and opinions on the topics presented during the 
interviews was noteworthy.  Even more telling, 10 of the participants gave vivid, 
unprompted accounts of their experiences dealing with soldiers who were suicidal.  
Participants translated their experiences with the ASPP system into specific 
recommendations for improvements in the areas they felt were most lacking in the ASPP.  
They also provided positive assessments of the system as well, mainly noting the amount 
of attention given to the topic to be noteworthy.  The final Chapter will propose 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study was conducted to address the problem of consistently higher rates of 
Army suicides when compared to other services, despite the efforts being taken to 
provide resources to soldiers.  This research is important because of the apparent absence 
of feedback from soldiers on why they feel the problem persists.  In their recent article, 
Bryan et al. present the idea that “the limited success of interventions to date hinges on 
inherent limitations in the philosophy upon which they are based” (2012, p. 96).  Without 
this type of user-based research, the Army may continue to fund solutions that are not 
optimal for soldiers.   
Decreasing military contingency operations and returning to a garrison-focused 
force will allow soldiers time to get the help they need.  The current fiscal situation 
within the DoD adds an extra level of complexity to the system.  If resources continue to 
be limited and the number of soldiers who need to use the system increases, we have to 
be able to eliminate what does not work and focus on what does.  This chapter will 
review the OV model developed for this study, present recommendations for 
improvement of the ASPP system, and recommend areas for future research. 
A. ASPP SYSTEM OV MODEL CONCLUSION  
It is important to reiterate that due to the aforementioned limitations of this study, 
these conclusions are based on the assessment of unit’s SP program structure and 
execution as identified by participants and leaders on the ground.  The conclusions 
presented aim to demonstrate how the gaps and issues identified by the first and fourth 
research questions fit into the overall system construct.   
Two systemic issues were identified throughout the course of the unit engagement 
that have not been detailed in previous sections.  First, providing more cross-talk and 
collaboration between uniformed unit leadership and the Army BH system is vital to 
increasing trust at the user level and decreasing barriers to services.  The Army views the 
key to the prevention of suicide as “positive leadership and deep concern by supervisors  
 
 80
of military personnel and DA civilian employees who are at increased risk of suicide” 
(U.S. Army, 2010, pg. 2).  Figure 34 shows how the synchronization of this leadership 
should ensure prevention measures at all levels.   
 
Figure 34.  Synchronized Prevention Measures (From USACHPPM Gatekeeper  
Training, n.d., p. 41)  
The SPPM interviewed for this analysis coined the phrase “selective 
enforcement” to describe her perspective of the execution of the SPTF as a “feeder” into 
the CHPC.  This assessment is different from the intent outlined in the AR and DA PAM.  
Scott identified the “fundamental need of the CHPC is active participation from the 
council members as well as cooperation among the stakeholders” (Scott, 2012, p. 40). 
The uniqueness of this unit’s program makes this assessment interesting and explains 
how their program is still successful despite the lack of a unity of effort within the CHPC.  
The SPPM makes it clear that the Fusion Cell has not replaced the SPTF or 
CHPC.  Based on the information gathered from multiple perspectives, the researcher 
feels the Fusion Cell has a more visible role at the unit level than the SPTF or CHPC and 
is unclear whether this is the intent of the policies governing SP efforts at the installation 
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and unit levels.  The researcher assesses the level of collaboration in this unit is greatly 
enhanced by the use of embedded BH professionals and the Fusion Cell.   The responses 
to questions on collaboration in a unit not as resourced could have produced different 
findings.  Any efforts that eliminate redundancy and ensure the leadership on both sides 
of the system gets the information, processes, and feedback necessary to track and 
minimize soldier risks should be noted as best practices.  Other installations should be 
aware that the use of this Fusion Cell model could increase collaboration between unit 
leaders and medical staffs; the addition of more embedded BH professionals could further 
enhance this collaboration.  In areas that have the ability and need, the model should be 
replicated.  Attention should also be given to strengthen collaboration between medical 
care teams and units leaders on determining when soldiers need in-patient care and when 
such care is not justified. 
Second, senior management should address the lack of a feedback loop between 
the ASPP and units with respect to current and applicable suicide statistics.  The units are 
required to submit data to higher authorities, but aside from the DoDSER annual reports, 
there is not a reciprocal dissemination of information back to the units that presents 
analysis they may be able to use to guide their programs and training.  Having an 
understanding of what statistical trends existed at a given installation over the course of a 
year or what trends have been identified across the Army in the course of a month are just 
two examples of information that could be disseminated to Company Commanders and 
First Sergeants to improve their awareness, detection, training, and prevention efforts.  
Senior leaders at the division level should be able to review suicide data and feedback 
from external agencies in a manner that is timely; in some instances feedback on suicide 
cases is over a year old.  There was also a general consensus between the SPPM and 
leaders that the ASIST training is expensive and at times hard to complete due to 
limitations.  Furthermore, the training is conducted using Army suicide data that is, in 
some cases, over six years old.  Improving the feedback loop between the units, the 
SPPM, and ASPP Program Office could address some of these issues.   
The third overall conclusion about the system has been previously detailed.  
Despite a high level of awareness of the program, users’ feelings towards training and 
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resource information grossly impacted the program’s reputation within this sample.  The 
system and physical interfaces received the most negative feedback, with soldiers feeling 
the training offered could be better and the communication about what resources are 
available could be more streamlined.  System drawbacks outweighed successes with 
respect to training.  An innovative system interface the unit is considering is the addition 
of SP training during each Soldier’s in-processing.  If implemented at the installation 
level, this would ensure individuals arrive to their units having their training completed 
and aware of the services offered as soon as they arrive to post.  Although this would 
require more coordination between servicing agencies and unit leadership, as previously 
noted stress may be higher during transitional periods.  In summary, soldiers understand 
the Army is making a dedicated and concerted effort in the operation of the ASPP, but 
the view that the most significant changes should be made in the area of training was 
repeated constantly.   
The OV model presented in Figure 11 was determined to be a valid representation 
of how the Prevention Activities of the ASPP are structured, however there were 
differences between the system in theory and how it functions in this unit.  In order to 
increase system effectiveness, this study concluded there were areas that should be 
continued due to their success, areas that need improvements, those that should be 
eliminated, and some that should be considered for new additions to the system.  These 
areas are diagrammed in the modified ASPP system OV model in Figure 35 and detailed 
in Table 5.   
The modified OV model presents the original OV model with adjustments to the 
tasks associated with the requirements for each of the five roles: senior program 
management, the installation CHPC/SPTF/SPPM, unit leaders, buddies, and soldiers.  
Although the majority of the tasks listed in the original model are presented here as well, 
some were added due to their importance and the amount of discussion that was given to 
the task during the interviews.  One example of such an addition is the requirement for all 
soldiers to complete the Global Assessment Tool (GAT) annually.   
The conclusions drawn on the strengths and weaknesses of the system tasks 
determined the need to code the tasks on the modified model.  Their associated meanings 
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are as follows: areas with asterisks should be sustained as best practices, areas in red 
should be improved, areas in strikethrough font should be eliminated, and areas in green 
should be considered for additions to the system.   
As an example of how to read and understand the modified model, the research 
team concluded that of the eight tasks associated with the buddy role, four should be 
examined.  The buddy’s role is to encourage appropriate responses in order to assist in 
suicide prevention, and in general, buddies will intervene to provide assistance using the 
ACE gatekeeper model.  The participants’ ability to reference and speak confidently on 
ACE was worth noting.  However the buddy’s ability to detect those at risk in order to 
provide this assistance should be improved.  For the reasons previously mentioned, 
soldiers were not as confident in their detection abilities, although most were aware of the 
warning signs discussed in SP training.  Additionally, buddies continue to facilitate the 
destigmatization efforts within their organizations.  The use of the buddy watch system 
should be eliminated, primarily due to its contribution to the stigma and minimization of 
trust and confidentiality for those who may be suicidal.  There were no additional tasks 


























Table 5.   Description of Modified ASPP System OV Model 
  
 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE ASPP SYSTEM 
From a system perspective, success may be best measured by eliminating all 
barriers between the users and the system.  From an HSI perspective, increasing total 
system performance should be the primary objective.  This section will cover some 
general recommendations for consideration, as well as provide specific recommendations 
and how to measure their effectiveness. 
At the outset of any improvement efforts, the Army should first conduct a 
systematic needs assessment to determine what soldiers’ needs are and their assessment 
of whether those needs are being met.  The San Diego Suicide Prevention Action Plan 
2011 Needs Assessment used a series of interviews with providers and patients to 
determine the needs of their population.  The research team defines a successful system 
of suicide prevention as one where are designed to meet the needs of individuals of all 
ASPP Program Office CHPC/SPTF/SPPM Unit Leaders Buddy Soldier 
Sustain ‐ Training Media 
(Interac ve Videos) 
‐ Observe SP Month 
(Providing Assistance w/ 
Units Programs) 
 
‐ Collabora on on Risk 
Reduc on (via Fusion Cell) 
 
‐ Use Embedded BH 
Providers (If available) 
 
‐ Observe SP Month 
(Develop Program 
throughout the Month) 
 
‐ Es mate Coping Abili es 
(Using Unit’s Risk Eval. 
Tool) 
‐ Buddy Care 
(Intervene to Prevent 
Suicides) 
‐ Increase Resilience 
(Use MRT Skills) 
 
‐ Use MFL Services 
(If available) 
Improve ‐ Program Theme 
(Equal Emphasis on 
Self‐Care/Buddy Care 
and Life Preserva on/
Suicide Preven on) 
 
‐ Informa on on User 
Resources (ASPP 
Website & ACE Card 
Usability, Remove 
CAC‐Only Resources) 
‐ General Par cipa on in 
CHPC Council Mee ngs  
‐ Posi ve Environment 
(More Confiden ality; 
Eliminate Requirement to 
Show BH Appointments) 
 
‐ Reduce S gma (Set the 
Example) 
 
‐ Training (Media, Size, and 
Facilitators) 
‐ Risk Detec on 
(Minimize Isola on and 
Maximize Awareness of 
Others) 
 





Eliminate ‐ Stand Down Day (Units 
determine training mes 
during SP Month) 
 
‐ Buddy Watch 
‐ Buddy Watch ‐ GAT 
Add ‐ Unit Feedback 
(Timely Trend 
Analysis) 
‐ Provide Fully 
Confiden al Services 
(A er‐Hours, Walk‐In, 
etc.) 
 
‐ Facilitate Training New 
Soldiers (During 
Installa on In‐Processing) 
‐ Improve Self‐Care 
(Seek Assistance, 
Increase Protec ve 
Factors) 
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ages and from diverse backgrounds (County of San Diego HHSA, 2011).  Conducting a 
needs assessment is a basic task normally accomplished at the outset of the system design 
process; this is particularly important for system training.  ASPP system modification 
should not be initiated without a needs assessment to gauge what stakeholders understand 
about the system, what their training deficiencies are, and whether individual and 
organizational goals are being met. 
The goal of the San Diego County needs assessment was to examine assets and 
gaps in the current SP services by examining the following components: 1) knowledge 
regarding SP and training needs, 2) existing services, 3) barriers to services, 4) agency 
coordination, and 5) gaps (County of San Diego HHSA, 2011, p. 45).  Table 6 
summarizes the questions asked in three of the surveys used in this assessment.  
Table 6.   San Diego County Needs Assessment Focus Areas (From County of San 
Diego HHSA, 2011, pp. 17, 45, 56) 
 
 
The results of this assessment showed, among other conclusions, five most noted 
sources of barriers to SP services: stigma, lack of available/appropriate services, 
insufficient follow-up care, limited access to services, and staffing issues (County of San 
Diego HHSA, 2011, pp. 71—72).  There were also particular conclusions drawn about 
providing services to the San Diego Veterans population.  The design of this needs 
Community Provider Survey
Knowledge of risk factors
Perceptions of suicide
Confidence in ability to address suicide for their target population
Training Needs Survey
Recognition of suicide risk factors
Identification of statements regarding suicide
Confidence in addressing suicide risk
Levels of Agency Collaboration Survey
No interaction: not aware of this organization, not currently
involved in any way
Networking: loosely defined roles, little communication, no shared 
decision making 
Cooperation: provide information to each other, somewhat defined 
roles, formal communication
Coordination: share information, defined roles, frequent
communication, some shared decision making
Collaboration: share ideas, share resources, frequent and 
prioritized communication, decisions are made collaboratively
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assessment was well planned and executed, providing an example that can easily be 
emulated for the ASPP system.  
Equally important to assessing user needs is understanding the dynamics of 
suicide within military populations and as operations change within the Army.  In 
recommending a different approach to suicide prevention, Mastroianni and Scott (2011) 
cite the need for a focus on the influence of military culture on these instances of suicide.  
If belongingness and burdensomeness in soldiers more likely to have practiced or 
considered suicide can lead to a suicidal event, assessments for burdensomeness and 
belongingness should be included in risk assessments.  Measuring belongingness can 
include assessing the disruption of social belonging caused during military transitions, 
such as returning from a deployment or changing duty stations (Mastroianni & Scott, 
2011).  Given the possible differences between personal beliefs and military culture, 
assessing burdensomeness should include considering a Soldier’s capacity “to 
meaningfully interpret their experiences in the military service” (Mastroianni & Scott, 
2011, p. 18).  These ideas support the opinion of one participant that the issue of suicide 
differs between those with experience in Iraq and those with experience in Afghanistan, 
given the significant differences between these two conflicts.  
Although the continuous transitions and societal factors cast a shadow on military 
culture, it is important to note the camaraderie and team aspects that are a part of the 
military can be used to benefit the ASPP.  One observer noted the success of a peer 
gatekeeper program in one unit’s BH advocate initiative, where the advocate was liaised 
between “command and support services, providing an early warning system on issues, 
attitudes, and behaviors within the unit, which may increase barriers to seeking help. 
Further, they ensured distribution of lessons learned from prior events even after 
inevitable transitions of organizational leadership” (Warner et al., 2011, pp. 134—135).   
Third, this research depended heavily on the use of the ASPP Website to conduct 
electronic research, generate the survey question booklet, and provide others a source for 
seeking additional information.  Only two personnel interviewed were familiar enough 
with the Website to be able to discuss its usefulness, but most others made general 
comments about frustrations with Army Web-based products (such as training) in 
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general.  In addition to general HFE considerations, some recommendations for the ASPP 
Website made over the course of this study include: separating monthly suicide statistics 
from the “Resources” section, providing basic information on the resources advertised on 
each page, and (as the main platform for the ASPP) the Program Office should consider 
conducting a usability study on the site during the next phase of updates. 
Other specific recommendations for improvements and supporting comments 
made by users are as follows: 
1. Increase focus on protective factors and engaged leadership during 
training and strategic communications: 
a. Self-resiliency is very important, by increasing that soldiers 
become more resilient and can care for others too.  Suicide 
Prevention and Resilience programs should be combined, they 
make it seem like it’s a separate problem but I think they are tied.  
It should be the goal to create more ready and resilient soldiers 
AND prevent them from committing suicide.  (female officer)  
b. An easy button for to improve the program? Puppies.  Make people 
happy.  Everybody needs a puppy.  I would enjoy my time in the 
military a lot more if I had a puppy.  Not having a pet is especially 
hard if you’re used to having more space and a pet before you 
joined the Army.   I’m in the barracks in a little room. People joke 
they are going to get married just so I can move off post and get a 
pet.  I would be at an animal shelter every day if we had one on 
post.  (male soldier) 
2. Reinforce the Army Team concept:  
a. We are isolated in society.  I live on post and there’s mixing, off-
post the rule rather than the exception is you go home and come 
out when you got to work, there’s not that interaction.  I have no 
idea what the percentage is, but it’s a safe bet most senior leaders 
live off post and that’s not the way it used to be. In my opinion if 
you’re in a command position you need to live on post because 
that’s where your soldiers are—at least the ones who tend to get in 
more trouble.  (male officer) 
b. I think the best training is whenever you get personal stories 
involved.  I have only really experienced them being delivered via 
video, but I think hearing from other people in the unit “I know 
someone who has dealt with suicide,” sharing those experiences 
would help more with what the Army is trying to do with suicide 
prevention. (female officer) 
3. Further destigmatization by increasing confidentiality of care, 
reinforcing trust, and improving follow-up:   
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a. Units have their protocol for buddy watch, but instead send them to 
a doctor and don’t make them wait a week to see a doctor.  Don’t 
send them back to work.  If you are going to send someone back to 
work—even with supervision—who is thinking about killing 
themselves, it’s counterproductive.  (male soldier) 
b. They should make it like Equal Opportunity and Sexual Assault 
where there is a time limit to get things resolved and you have 
restricted and non-restricted reporting. Or they can dual hat 
someone in the Company to be a Suicide Prevention Officer and 
keep track of issues.  (male NCO) 
c. Putting someone on suicide watch can make a Soldier want to 
commit suicide.  (male officer) 
4. Improve strategic communications on resources available and steps to 
take when providing assistance: 
a. Limit the number of programs and focus our resources on those 
programs. If you put a marketing campaign behind just a few of 
them you would be more effective. Take these 26 and get rid of 
3/4s because each takes separate funding, let’s take that money and 
focus them on fewer that would be better.  (male officer)  
b. People associate Chaplains with religion.  I think that needs to be 
dispelled; soldiers need to know Chaplains are counselors. (female 
officer) 
c. Instead of the Army spending money on ACE cards, give the digits 
to the units and let them add the contact numbers.  (female officer) 
5. Improve collaboration on and effectiveness of prevention efforts:  
a. The medical treatment facility is 30 min down the road and the 
acute care clinic is only open until 1830.  Here, battalion 
Psychologists do a fellowship to get operational experience and all 
of our Commanders who have them give phenomenal feedback.  
It’s the easiest access to care and might be the most effective way 
to do things.  (male officer) 
b. The military doesn’t know how to deal with soldiers coming back 
from Afghanistan; it’s different than coming back from Iraq.  You 
could see the improvement coming back from Iraq, not 
Afghanistan it’s one million percent different.  You can’t throw a 
rock around here without hitting someone who has been to Afghan 
more than once and there is absolutely no improvement over there.  
You witness your friends being hurt and killed and our blood being 
shed on that soil and we get pissed off, we ask why are they 
sending us there, we have no faith in our government. And that 
messes with you.  It’s a different kind of mental disturbance and 
you lose faith in your leadership at a much higher echelon.  How 
 90
do we fix that?  I think it’s really good to have the prior service BH 
people who can relate.  I’ve had soldiers who needed help and they 
were much more receptive and I saw how much more they liked 
their counselors who were prior service. They were excited and 
would say “I really think this is what I needed.”  I can tell that it 
makes a difference. (female NCO) 
c. When a provider says a Soldier needs to be hospitalized, we 
integrate the green-suiters in the decision-making. The brigade 
psychiatrist, battalion nurse, battalion chaplain, and brigade 
surgeon, convene a board to discuss and justify what the 
determination needs to be, getting feedback from the medical team 
and the command team.  The board looks at it holistically and 
makes a decision; you get a more holistic view.  It’s a one-day 
process so it doesn’t stretch out the process. With this approach we 
have documentation of supporting treatment and not supporting 
treatment.  (male officer) 
d. I think we need to have more fusion and synchronization and there 
has to be some type of relationship with the provider and the unit.  
We are going to end up having to put military back in psych 
positions and when you do that I think we will have better results. 
Because you have green tab to green tab and you have a better 
relationship.  I don’t think the providers feel as comfortable talking 
to Commanders due to the credentials. There is a lack of trust. 
(male officer) 
6. Eliminate a mandated training day and style, but ensure units 
conduct interactive SP training during SP Month:  
a. For suicide prevention month it should be the unit’s prerogative 
how they conduct training.  We don’t have women’s Stand Down 
Day.  We are spending this amount of energy on .001 percent of 
the population who probably came in with issues.  (female officer) 
b. I wouldn’t put everyone in the auditorium. If you are going to do 
something to address SP, you should make people happy, a day of 
activities to cheer people up like an Org Day.  Have booths set up 
with different kinds of things, times where you can go to classes 
and learn things, where you can choose what you want to learn 
about.  Mass training loses its impact, people get more out of small 
groups.  In a big group you feel detached, everything is better 
when you individualize it.  (male soldier) 
c. You might want to take someone from out of the chain of 
command to give the class, someone they don’t know from another 
brigade or division.  (male soldier) 
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d. Make sure that we reduce the amount of people in the size of the 
class, change the instructors to key leaders.  In my last unit, I took 
time out to make sure I instructed one of the classes.  (male officer) 
e. At a previous unit for training we had an uncensored skit that was 
realistic, it actually makes you think and it’s real. More realistic 
training would be better.  There was a set of videos that came out 
that were scenario type, some of them work and were ok.  If you 
could find someone who actually thought about it or tried and 
failed would be more realistic.  (male soldier) 
7. Couple SP with Resilience training when possible:  
a. We have to train soldiers to deal when someone is there and when 
they are not there.  Because you will not always have someone 
around, God forbid you’re on a deployment and your whole squad 
is killed, you have to be able to say man this sucks let me figure 
out my next step.  (male soldier) 
8. Make ASIST and MRT certification more effective and relevant 
a. It costs $30 to train every ASIST.  If we can indoctrinate that into 
the Army system and get our own product, we can do Train the 
Trainer, which would be more beneficial.  I like the ASIST 
materials, but we can’t afford it financially or time wise.  (male 
officer) 
b. It’s those SSGs and SGTs dealing with the soldiers’ issues.  They 
give MRT to the seniors, but I believe MRT should be given to the 
more junior soldiers so they can fix it at the lowest level.  (female 
NCO) 
Table 7 summarizes these eight recommendations, recommended strategies 
garnered from system analysis and user feedback, and the possible measures of 
effectiveness.  These recommendations result from the determination of system 
mismatches, explanation of the respective gaps, and the combination of the researcher’s 
systemic conclusions with user recommendations.  If implemented, the strategies used to 
accomplish these recommendations could further strengthen the system design and 




Table 7.   ASPP System Recommendations, Strategies, and Measures of Effectiveness 
Recommendations Strategies Measures of Effectiveness
1) Increase focus on protective 
factors and engaged leadership 
during training and strategic 
communications
1) Conduct an Army-wide suicide prevention needs 
assessment that focuses on buddy and self care equally
2) Leverage more opportunities for innovative, morale 
boosting activities geared towards unit and soldier needs
1) Responsiveness: Response rates based on method of 
gathering data
2) Feedback: Goal should be to garner qualitative and 
quantitative feedback from representative sample of at least 
25% of all components
2) Reinforce the Army Team 
concept
1) Ensure leaders understand how risk detection and sharing 
experiences within units increases trust consistent with the 
Army Values
2) Allow time and resources for team building activities 
1) Unit Cohesiveness: Awareness of and caring for others
should be high within a section and at least medium within a 
unit
2) Trust: Low trust of leadership and of fellow Soldiers will be 
a barrier to care
3) Further destigmatization by 
increasing confidentiality of 
care, reinforcing trust, and 
improving follow-up
1) Hold leaders accountable for contributing to stigma
2) Hold Soldiers are accountable for false reporting
3) Eliminate activities that increase likelihood of stigma 
(such as buddy watch and showing appointment slips)
Confidentiality: Number of personnel who are informed a 
Soldier is seeking mandatory or voluntary care (lower is better)
4) Improve strategic 
communications on resources 
available and steps to take 
when providing assistance
1) Improve organization and presentation of ASPP Website
2) Streamline the resources being funded and the media 
used to advertise 
3) Re-define requirement for or eliminate GAT
4) Allow units to modify ACE cards with warning signs and 
unit contact information
1) Usability: Effectiveness of web resources based on user 
feedback during Usability Study
2) Applicability: Whether resource adds value to ASPP system 
for the user, adds value for the command, or is a requirement 
that does not add value
5) Improve collaboration on 
and effectiveness of 
prevention efforts
1) Provide after-hours and walk-in appointments on post
2) Increase uniformed, embedded and inpatient BH
3) Increase awareness that Chaplains provide general 
counseling as well as religious support
1) Access to Voluntary/Involuntary Care: number of 
interfaces/interactions between the individual and care
2) Time: Amount of patient wait time
6) Eliminate a mandated 
training day and style, but 
ensure units conduct 
interactive SP training during 
SP Month
1) Replace Stand Down Day training with small group, 
scenario-based discussions at the unit's discretion 
throughout Suicide Prevention Month
2) Encourage creativity with training and share best 
practices
3) Minimize CAC-required training
1) Length: Training time
2) Method: Training media
3) Training Leader KSAs: Rank, Experience, Duty
4) Group Size/Composition: Number/makeup of personnel 
trained simultaneously
5) Transfer of Training: Positive, Negative, or Zero
6) Overall Assessment: Above Standard, Meets Standard, 
Below Standard
7) Couple SP with Resilience 
training when possible
Increase emphasis on taking care of self through Resilience
training and use of confidential services
Training Focus: 1:1 Ratio between Self-Care and Buddy Care, 
Suicide Prevention and Life Preservation
8) Make ASIST and MRT 
certification more effective 
and relevant
1) Improve personnel selection
2) Optimize training cost/time/effectiveness
3) Facilitate unit programs as joint effort between 
ASIST/MRT personnel
1) Personnel Assignments: Ensure ASIST/MRT at BN level
and above
2) Training Cost: Based upon budgetary constraints




Scott’s research intended to determine the means and effectiveness of the U.S. 
Army BH System.  He suggests “a rearrangement of the system architecture to enable 
integrated work across organizational boundaries in order to reduce waste generated 
through structural inefficiencies” (Scott, 2012, p. 2).  Whereas Scott focused on the 
macro-level, the systematic approach of this study focused on the macroergonomic 
implications of the ASPP system at the micro-level.  Similar conclusions were drawn that 
the Army’s current system for preventing, recognizing, and treating some conditions is 
“highly fragmented and not suited for providing the volume of treatment required by 
veterans returning from combat” because some of the stakeholders lack an agreed-upon 
common purpose (Scott, 2012, p. 8).  
Three outcomes from this research show obvious gaps in BH services that feed 
into the ASPP system.  First, BH providers at every site analyzed stated Armed Forces 
Health Longitudinal Technology Application (AHLTA) as the single biggest frustration 
in their daily operations due to its unfriendly interface, unreliability, and limitations on 
data entry capabilities.  Second, limitations of the DA Form 3349, Physical Profile, used 
to describe physical limitations due to a medical condition was reported as inadequate by 
providers and commanders at each site (Scott, 2012).  Finally, interview responses 
showed an obvious and problematic mismatch between DoD Instruction 6490.08, 
ALARACT 160/2010, and DoD Instruction 6025.18-R56 with Health Insurance Privacy 
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) guidelines: 
It is in this communication that we observe the knowledge sharing policy 
that inhibits the much-needed flow of information between the enterprises.  
In thirteen interview sessions with 110 total respondents from the Chain of 
Command at three FORSCOM installations, there was a uniform response 
that personal information protection under the Health Insurance Privacy 
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) was held up as an impediment to 
successful information exchange with Behavioral Health providers.  
Conversely, over 75 percent of the 33 clinical providers interviewed stated 
that they cannot or would not share protected information with 
commanders due to concerns over patient privacy and fear of losing their 
medical license due to a HIPAA violation.  This is troubling for two 
reasons: first, commanders are responsible for the health and welfare of 
their soldiers as well as mission readiness.  If a provider has information 
that the commander needs in order to execute on these responsibilities, 
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particularly if the soldier is a danger to himself or others, then that 
information must be shared.  Second, DoD regulations and MEDCOM 
guidance require that this information must be shared.  (Scott, 2012, pp. 
56—57) 
Among other recommendations, Scott encouraged the development of three 
shared strategic objectives for a more effective BH system within the Army.  Of the 
three, one merits reiteration here due to the need for SP efforts to “build resilient soldiers 
through proactive education and skills development to mitigate self-imposed stresses” 
(Scott, 2012, p. 75).  The recommendations presented here can be implemented at the 
lowest level within units, as well as across the Army as we continue to adapt the ASPP 
and CSF2 programs. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Caine asserts “at the individual level, suicide can be prevented readily—if there is 
the ability to intervene in a timely fashion before someone reaches the “edge of the cliff” 
(Caine, 2012, p. S5).  Prevention efforts can be varied in their approach, however, 
prevention should be aimed at addressing the individual’s need to minimize risk factors 
and maximize protective factors.  The following sections present concepts and strategies 
with respect to these two needs that have been gleaned from current research.  These 
approaches have either been or should be considered for inclusion in the ASPP system.   
Suicide prevention research is being accomplished by organizations both internal 
and external to the military and from multiple facets of the suicide issue.  This research 
includes epidemiology studies, such as the Army STARRS program.  Going beyond 
epidemiological analysis, public health research views SP as a public health issue and 
presents findings such as “increasing evidence of sleep disturbances as warning signs for 
suicide and suicide-related behaviors, growing concerns related to over-prescription of 
opioid analgesics, [and] increased emphasis on restriction of access to firearms in those at 
risk for suicide” (Lineberry & O’Connor, 2012, p. 875).  Prevention strategy research is 




physician recognition, gives insight into proven means of effective prevention (Lineberry 
& O’Connor, 2012, p. 875).  These sections are presented in no particular order, but 
grouped by their intended purpose. 
1. Including Poor Sleep Quality as a Risk Factor 
When studying the impacts of overall health and fitness on the possibility of 
suicidal behavior, sleep quality is a factor that should be considered.  A 2010 study 
showed that of 1,584 patients at a community-based sleep center, 13 percent reported 
suicidal ideations and 4.5 percent reported levels of ideation consistent with clinical risk 
(Krakow, 2011).  Although correlation between sleep disturbance and suicidal thoughts 
does not indicate causation, “it seems plausible that evidence-based treatments of sleep 
disorders would lower suicidal risks” (Krakow, 2011, para. 8).  
A sleep disturbance is a measure of sleep interruption, with high levels of sleep 
disturbance being an implication of low quality sleep.  Those diagnosed with sleep apnea, 
for example, show instances of sleep disturbance during a sleep study that are greater 
than the average individual.  Sleep disorders may not always present themselves as 
obvious issues, given that many patients self-report sleeping extensive hours, not 
realizing the time in bed is not synonymous with time in deep stages of sleep.  Within 
military personnel, reporting poor sleep as a health issue is generally frowned upon, due 
to the common perception that severe sleep issues are mainly found in overweight and 
diabetic patients.  However, sleep specialists assert sleep issues that go untreated for 
prolonged periods of time are health hazards that can create biological and physiological 
issues.  Increasingly, attention is being given to the psychological impacts of sleep issues 
as well.  The number of soldiers with diagnosed sleep issues continues to increase.   
Hyman, Ireland, Frost, & Cottrell (2012) report in 2007, “of those who completed 
suicide, 17.5 percent of Army and 24 percent of Air Force personnel had a history of 
sleep prescriptions…and through 2007, the use of sleep medications increased with the 
number of deployments for all services” from 6.1 percent of 82 in 2005 to 17.54 percent 
of 114 in 2007 (p. S144).  To ignore the possible impact of sleep disturbance on suicidal 
events would be to misinform the population.  There are simple diagnostic techniques and 
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informative measures that can be implemented to ensure soldiers are aware of their sleep 
states.  Additionally, better sleep within a unit can affect the quality of work during shifts 
and individual cognitive processing.  This is particularly important before, during, and 
after deployment cycles.   
Ribeiro, Pease, Gutierrez, Silva, Bernert, Rudd, et al. (2012) explain the state of 
physiological overarousal that many suicide victims display prior to incident as a product 
of insomnia, with “the state of over-arousal appear[ing] to be a higher-order, underlying 
substrate with several manifest indicators, including various aspects of agitation and sleep 
disturbance” (p. 744). The research team’s literature review included studies from 
1975—2011, from which they were able to conclude theirs was the first cross-sectional, 
longitudinal study of a military population (totaling 311 soldiers) to measure sleep with 
relation to suicidal behavior and ideation, depression and other variables (Ribeiro et al., 
2012).  The noteworthy results of the study show “when baseline insomnia symptom 
index scores were entered as a predictor of later suicide attempt, controlling for MCMI 
depression and BHS hopelessness scores, an insomnia symptom index showed a 
significant longitudinal relationship to suicide attempts at follow-up. Neither baseline 
suicidal ideation nor depression performed similarly (Ribeiro et al., 2012). 
2. Including Self-Awareness as a Protective Factor 
An individual’s ability to self-treat prior to becoming suicidal is closely related to 
how well he or she understands his or her coping abilities and resilience levels.  Cooper 
(2004) recommends raising self-awareness by implementing personality tests for enlisted 
personnel as they are administered for officers. Cooper notes, “using the U.S. Naval 
Academy as an example, all Midshipmen are given various tests to help them understand 
their strengths and weakness, as well as general dispositions…one example is the 
Meyer’s Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI)” (Cooper, 2004, p. 68). 
The Army established the Army Resilience Training (ART) to inculcate “positive 
psychology” tactics developed at the University of Pennsylvania.  Figure 36 shows how 
resilience as a discipline contributes to SP outcomes.  Units are now required to assign 
and train MRTs and conduct Resiliency training within the unit.  Once certified by the 
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MRT course, MRTs are able to share the skills they learn within their units.  These skills 
not only help individuals identify their abilities, but also recognize the abilities of others, 
further strengthening self- and unit-awareness. 
 
Figure 36.  Organizing Framework for Promoting Resilience within the Military  
(From Meredith, Sherbourne, Gaillot, Hansell, Ritschard,  
Parker, et al., 2011, p. 8)  
In a paper for the Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the United States 
Army, Felix asserts, “establishing a detailed self-awareness baseline, followed by 
emotion resilience training, can start a positive chain reaction of better-informed 
decisions for the Soldier at home, on the battlefield, within the highest levels of the DoD 
and in the quiet places within each of us” (Felix, 2011, p. 4).  In a 2008 pamphlet, the 
Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) first defined the growing concept of 
the Human Dimension as encompassing the “moral, physical, and cognitive components 
of Soldier, leader, and organizational development and performance” (US Army 
TRADOC, 2008, p. ii).  Combined, these efforts present a view of training that focuses 
on the individual’s personal knowledge, skills, and abilities that are necessary for optimal 
performance and decision-making.   
The argument can be made that increasing self-awareness will allow for better 
decision making abilities, especially under highly stressful operational and personal 
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conditions.  While the Army currently requires soldiers to complete annual GATs and 
offers training modules under the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness (CSF) Program, there 
may be ways to enhance these assessments beyond the emotional, social, spiritual, and 
family fitness dimensions – specifically for the purposes of SP.  Combining the Human 
Dimension and decision engineering concepts, a new approach of human dimension 
engineering can supplement the current ART and CSF programs, with the purpose of 
increasing soldiers’ self-awareness so that they are able to make better, help-seeking 
decisions.  
Two methods of increasing self-awareness that were found in the literature on 
military suicidality are the use of the Life Preservation Index (LPI) and Post-Traumatic 
Growth Inventory (PTGI).  The LPI was built to propose the expansion of risk and 
protective factors to include family structure and functioning, religious 
affiliation/behavior, and organizational culture (Bah, Wilson, Fatkin, Atkisson, Brent, & 
Horton et al., 2011).  To assess soldiers’ LPI, they are tested on three indices: Personal 
Fulfillment and Social Support, Spirituality and Religious Practices, and Self-efficacy.  
The sub-items listed in Table 8 measure the indices: 
Table 8.   Summary of Life Preservation Index Measures  




Personal Fulfillment and Social Support
How happy is the person
How strongly they are bonded with their family
How helpful relatives would be if they had a problem
How comfortable they feel talking about feelings to relatives
How helpful friends would be if they had a problem
How comfortable they feel talking about feelings to friends
Spirituality and religious practice
Whether they believe in life after death
Whether they believe the world is basically good or bad
Attendance at religious services
Self-efficacy
Confidence in their ability to identify persons at risk of suicide
Confidence in their ability to refer the person at risk to help
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In a 2011 retrospective analysis of BH clinic electronic screening responses, 
researchers were able to conclude the more post-traumatic growth the service members 
reported, the less suicidal ideation they subsequently espoused (Bush, Skopp, McCann, & 
Luxton, 2011).  Although there were limitations to the study based on their inability to 
validate the results with the given population, there is enough evidence to warrant future 
research to determine if individual resilience mediates the impact of exposure to trauma.  
The goal of the PTGI is to “assesses positive outcomes reported by persons who have 
experienced traumatic events” (Bush et al., 2011, p. 1217).  The specific measures for the 
PTGI are broken into five categories: new possibilities, relating to others, spiritual 
change, personal strength, and appreciation of life.  Bridging the gap between decision 
science and military application will require a new field— decision engineering (Felix, 
2011, p. 4).  The author further recommends the incorporation of decision engineering 
into human dimension training.   
3. Implementing Evidence-Based Approaches to Care 
Evidence-based approaches are those backed by empirical research showing 
positive results.  More simply put, a non-evidence-based strategy lacks proper proof of 
actually working.  Jobes, Lento, and Brazaitis (2012) note current clinical approaches to 
suicide prevention lack effectiveness using examples such as: reduction of inpatient care 
due to rising healthcare costs and more stringent admission requirements, lack of mental 
health clinicians’ basic training in suicide risk management, and the unpopular use of 
buddy watch.  Mann (2011) asserts we must conduct systemic observational studies and 
evaluation of defined interventions to determine what works best.  “Opinion must give 
way to the facts gained from studies, and then studies must set treatment and prevention 
procedures”  (Mann, 2011, p. 123). 
Jobes et al. (2012) developed the Collaborative Assessment and Management of 
Suicidality (CAMS), which aims to increase the collaboration between the clinician and 




struggles due to the “clinician as expert” approach.  Decreasing the barrier between the 
patient and the healthcare provider should help increase the patient’s motivation to 
succeed and make for a stronger treatment plan. 
Current studies and clinical trials of CAMS, including implementation at two Air 
Force outpatient clinics, provide support for its effectiveness (Jobes et al., 2012).  Figure 
37 shows the differences between how long members of each treatment group remained 
suicidal.  Despite its limitations, findings from the Air Force study that compared 
treatment with CAMS to treatment as usual (TAU) were: 
Prior to treatment, there were no significant differences in the medical 
utilization of these two groups. However, after treatment, CAMS patients 
had statistically significantly fewer and shorter (measured in minutes) 
emergency room visits, as well as fewer and shorter non-mental health 
appointments than did TAU patients. These findings persisted for the 6 
months following study participation and represent statistically significant 
differences (p = .02). Furthermore, whereas the CAMS patients did not 
engage in significantly different utilization before and after treatment, the 
TAU patients engaged in significantly more appointments following their 
suicide-related mental health treatment.  The participants in this study 
were well matched to the overall Air Force population and to the profile of 
individuals who are at high risk for suicide, experiencing significant 
distress, who are diagnosed with a mood or adjustment disorder. Patients 
in the CAMS treatment group resolved their suicidality more quickly and 
attended fewer non-mental health medical appointments than did patients 
receiving TAU.  (Jobes et al., 2012, p. 610—612) 
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Figure 37.  Estimated proportion of patients in the CAMS and TAU group to remain  
suicidal as a function of session number.  (From Jobes et al., 2012, p. 610) 
More than one peer-reviewed article cited Knox’s study as the best analysis of an 
evidence-based approach for a military population (Bagley et al., 2010).  Systematically, 
evidence-based methods present the best means of measuring potential and actual results 
of changes as they are implemented.  While other approaches lack empirical validation, 
evidence-based strategies provide measures by which to determine effectiveness.  The 
Army should use these types of methods in the future due to their scientific value, and 
ability to potentially provide cost savings over time. 
4. Leveraging Lessons Learned from College-Based Suicide Prevention 
Statistics show that 18 to 24 year olds who are in college are at half the risk of 
suicide compared to their non-student counterparts.  The conclusion drawn “is that being 
part of a campus community is believed to have a protective effect” (Ilakkuvan, Snyder, 
& Wiggins, 2011, p. 3).  Due to the similarities between young soldiers entering the 
military and young adults entering college, it is worth reviewing best practices of college 
campus SP efforts.  “Suicide is the third leading cause of death for youths between the 
ages of 15 and 24 years…and is believed to be the second leading cause of death for 
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college students because of the low rate of homicide in this population” (Drum,  
Brownson, Denmark, & Smith, 2009, p. 214).  Drum et al. (2009) developed a Web-
based survey on suicidal thought, intent, and action that was completed by 26,000 
undergraduate students from 70 colleges and universities.  The tabular results of this 
study are in Appendix D.  The research team hypothesized “an effective approach to 
suicide prevention cannot continue to rely entirely on individual-focused counseling 
services” (Drum et al., 2009, p. 214).  The authors recommend a problem-focused 
approach in order to avoid focusing on just those students experiencing a suicidal crisis in 
order to address the entire continuum of suicidality (Drum et al., 2009, p. 220).    
Finally, many may ask if it is even possible to solve the problem of suicides in the 
military.  How we measure the success of the program should go beyond aiming for a 
decreased number of completed suicides.  We will know we have made progress as an 
Army when there is an increase in system use, a decrease in all types of suicide events, 
and life preservation is discussed just as often as suicide prevention.  Mastroianni and 
Scott (2011) argue for the reframing of the military’s approach to suicide due to our 
current understanding of the problem being incomplete.  This HSI-driven research aimed 
to provide a more complete assessment of the problem and current prevention strategies 
by leveraging the voice of intermediate managers, unit leaders, and individual soldiers.  
As a result, three themes proved important as measures of success for the ASPP system: 
engaged leadership reinforced with confidentiality and trust, increased protective factors 
using self- and buddy care, and an operating environment that relies on the 
aforementioned to eliminate the perpetuation of a stigma.  A hopeful outgrowth of this 
effort is a tool to help unit command teams better understand their soldiers’ perspective 
and tailor their programs to be highly effective, despite time and resource constraints.   
Suicide is a personal decision.  But those who have lost someone they know to 
suicide can attest that many left behind may feel its impact deeply and for extended 
periods of time.  Fundamentally, the military combats this individual issue by providing a 
team-based prevention program and offering a myriad of services for soldiers to get help.  
However, despite every effort and properly taken step on the SP continuum, we must 
remember that this problem remains complex, and in some cases, uninfluenced by family 
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members, friends, co-workers, and fellow soldiers.  If a reframing is to occur in how 
today’s military should approach SP, we must continue to determine the proper balance 
between team roles and individual responsibilities. 
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APPENDIX A. FOUNDATIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS FROM 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TFPS 
The following full list of recommendations was taken from The Challenge and the 
Promise: Strengthening the Force, Preventing Suicide, and Saving Lives, which was 
authored by the DoD TFPS and published as a final report in August 2010, pages 47–49.  
As the Task Force conducted its work, the members arrived at unanimous agreement that 
successful suicide prevention had to be structured using a public health model with 
defined focus areas, each containing strategies inherent to a comprehensive suicide 
prevention approach.  
The Task Force considered 49 findings and 76 recommendations to be report worthy. In 
addition, the Task Force developed 13 foundational recommendations that aggregated 
several of the targeted recommendations. These 13 underscore success of all the 
recommendations. Without implementation of these critical actions, the other 
recommendations are destined for failure. The 13 foundational recommendations are:  
1. Create a “Suicide Prevention Policy Division” at OSD within USD(P&R) to 
standardize policies and procedures with respect to resiliency, mental fitness, life skills, 
and suicide prevention. The office will provide standardization, integration of best 
practices, and general oversight, serve as a change agent, and establish an ongoing 
external review group of non-DoD experts to assess progress. Furthermore, this office 
will provide guidance from which the Services can design and implement their suicide 
prevention programs.  
2. Keep suicide prevention programs in the leadership lane and hold leaders 
accountable at all levels for ensuring a positive command climate that promotes the well-
being, total fitness, and “help seeking” of their Service Members. A significant focus on 
developing better tools to assist commanders in suicide prevention must be undertaken.  
3. Reduce stress on the force. The pace of operations in today’s military exceeds 
the ability of Service Members to be restored to their optimal state of readiness. There is 
a supply and demand mismatch that creates a cumulative negative impact on the force. 
Reduce stress by ensuring the quantity and quality of dwell time allows for individual 
restoration as the force is reconstituted over and over again. This will allow Service 
Members to reestablish relationships and connectedness. If necessary, either grow the 
size of the force to ensure additional uniformed end-strength to meet the demand or 
reduce the mission demand.  
4. Focus efforts on Service Member well-being, total fitness (of the mind, body, 
and spirit), and development of life skills and resiliency to increase protective factors and 
decrease risk factors. This is the pinnacle of primary prevention.  
5. Develop a Comprehensive Stigma Reduction Campaign Plan that attacks the 
issue on multiple fronts to encourage help-seeking behavior and normalizes the care of 
the “hidden wounds” incurred by Service Members.  
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6. Strengthen strategic messaging to enhance positive communications that 
generate the behaviors and outcomes desired rather than highlighting the negative 
messaging about today’s challenges. The focus of messaging must migrate from speaking 
solely about the “tragedy” of suicide and the “actions” being taken to messages that 
reduces stigma, encourages help seeking, portrays concerned leadership, and inspires 
hope by showing that help really works.  
7. Develop skills-based training in all aspects of training regarding suicide 
prevention. The current awareness and education efforts about suicide prevention are 
adequate, but skills-based training is deficient, especially among buddies, family 
members, first-line supervisors, clergy, and behavioral health personnel.  
8. Incorporate program evaluation in all suicide prevention programs to determine 
the effectiveness of each program in obtaining its intended outcome.  
9. Coordinate and leverage the strengths of installation and local community 
support services for both Active and Reserve Component Service Members. Community 
health and access to quality, competent services are essential to suicide prevention.  
10. Ensure continuity and the management of quality behavioral healthcare, 
especially while in transition periods, to facilitate a seamless transfer of awareness, 
management, and treatment as Service Members change locations. Transitions must be 
actively managed; and tools must be developed to actively manage them.  
11. Mature and expand the DoDSER to serve as the main surveillance method to 
inform future suicide prevention efforts. Further standardize data collection processes. 
Robust surveillance will produce data that allows us to anticipate and avoid future 
occurrences of that event before the individual or population (or unit) reaches a crisis 
point.  
12. Standardize suicide investigations and expand their focus to learn about the 
last hours, days, and weeks preceding a suicide or attempted suicide. Pattern suicide 
investigations on aviation accident safety investigation procedures and use the safety 
investigation process as a model to develop a standardized suicide investigation process.  
13. Support and fund ongoing DoD suicide prevention research to enhance our 
knowledge and inform future suicide prevention efforts, and to incorporate evidenced-
based solutions. Focused research in suicide prevention for Service Members is essential 
to identifying best practices, decreasing variation in prevention practices, and in 
achieving desired outcomes.  
Considerable effort has been expended by DoD, the Services, and innumerable caring and 
dedicated individuals across the world in support of Service Members and their families. 
The findings and recommendations herein are intended to guide DoD in its efforts to 
enhance the work already being done while ensuring a more fit and ready force for 
meeting the demands of serving in the military. It is the Task Force’s belief that 
implementation of the recommendations and strategic initiatives in this report will save 
lives and will further propel DoD as a national leader in suicide prevention. 
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APPENDIX B. ASPP SYSTEM HIERARCHICAL TASK ANALYSIS 
 
Figure 38.  ASPP System Top-Down and Bottom-Up HTA 
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APPENDIX C. SUICIDE RISK FACTORS FOR MILITARY 
POPULATIONS 
Table 9.   Sociocultural and Military Risk Factors Associated with Suicides of Army 









Table 10.   Psychological Risk Factors Associated with Suicides of Army Soldiers 











Table 11.   Event Characteristics and Stressors Associated with Suicides of Army 
Soldiers 2004-2009 (From Black et al., 2011, pp. 444-445) 
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APPENDIX D. RISK FACTORS FOR COLLEGE POPULATIONS  
Table 12.   Important Factors in Preventing a Suicide Attempt  
















Table 14.   Events Rated as Having a Large Impact on Seriously Considering Suicide in 
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APPENDIX E. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS  
1) The following are examples of Suicide Prevention Resources.  Please answer the 
following questions for each. 
 
 
How familiar are you with 
each item?
If you selected C on the 
previous question, how 
useful was it?
A: Never seen it or used it 1: Not useful at all
B: Have seen it, but don't use it 2: Not useful
C: Have seen it and use it 3: Neither useful, nor not useful
D: I don't know/I don't remember 4: Useful
5: Extremely useful
6: I don't know/I don't remember
1: “Suicide Awareness Guide for Leaders” Flipbook  
2: “A Leader’s Guide to Suicide Prevention” Pamphlet
3: “ACE” Card
4:  "Suicide Prevention Month" Poster
5: “Don’t Deal with a Problem Alone” Poster
6: “Shoulder to Shoulder” Video
7: “The Home Front” Video
8: “Soldier Leader Risk Reduction Tool”
9: “Global Assessment Tool”
10.  Army Regulation 600-63
11.  Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-24
12: “Army Leader Book” Mobile Application
13: “The Soldier’s Blue Book” Mobile Application
14: “Army Red Book” Report
15: “Army Gold Book” Report
16: “Military One Source” Program
17: “Got Your Six” Program
18: “Make the Connection” Program
19: “National Suicide Prevention Lifeline” Program
20: TRICARE Mental Health Resource Center
21: Community Resource Guides
22: “Coaching into Care” Program
23: “Military Crisis Line” Program
24: “Ready and Resilient” Campaign
25: "Comprehensive Soldier Fitness" Program







2) Rate how helpful you think the following are for soldiers seeking help for suicidal 








Helpful Extremely Helpful No Opinion
1.  Spouse
2.  Other family 
member
3.  Friend




7.  External Resource 
(such as Army 
8.  Unit NCO/Officer 
who is  ASIST 
9.  Unit NCO/Officer 
who is MRT Trained
10.  Other (write in):
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3) Please select which of the following you prefer for Suicide Prevention Training 
(check one in each category):  
 
Powerpoint Entire Battalion Senior Officer (MAJ or higher)
Online Entire Company Senior NCO (SFC or higher)
Video Platoon Sergeant
Discussion Squad/Section Chaplain
I don't like any of these styles One-on-One I don't know
Other (write in): I don't like any of the sizes Other (write in): 
Other (write in): 
TRAINING MEDIA (select one) TRAINING SIZE (select one) TRAINING LEADER (select one)
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Soldiers don't ask for help
Other Soldiers don’t offer help































13.  Do you have any additional comments? Open-ended
Open-ended12.  Is there a resource that you or someone you know has used that helped preventa suicide?
11.  What is the part of the program that needs the most improvement?  Some 
examples could be unit training, individual training, number of resources available, 
confidentiality, etc.
6.   What do you think is the main reason suicide events are not detected early? A 
suicide event can be a thought, behavior, plan, attempt, or completion.
9.  Once a Soldier says he/she is suicidal or a buddy identifies he/she is suicidal, 
what do you think are the steps taken to get them help the way the system is set up 
now.  Is this process effective or could it be improved?
8. If you needed to refer a Soldier for help, would you know who in your unit is 
certified in a) ASIST? b) MRT?
10.  What is the best part about the suicide prevention program? Some examples 
could be unit training, individual training, number of resources available, 
confidentiality, etc.
4.  There are four categories of Soldier needs for suicide prevention. Please line 
them up left to right in order of importance to you.
5.  What is your assessment of Suicide Prevention Stand Downs?
7.  Is there a stigma associated with seeking help?
1.  How confident are you that you can recognize a Soldier/buddy needs help in 
order to prevent a suicide?
2.  How confident are you that you will intervene if a Soldier/buddy needs help?
3.  Should suicide prevention training focus more on buddy care, more on self care, 
or an equal amount of both?
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RISK REDUCTION INCREASED PROTECTION BUDDY CARE
ENGAGED 
LEADERSHIP




Exposure to Trauma, 
Impact of Transition 
Periods, Legal/Discipline 
Problems, etc.
Total Fitness, Resilience, 
Sprituality,





Peer Support Groups, 
Buddies who 
Ask/Care/Escort if you 
need help, 
Confidentiality, Trust
Leaders who know their 
personnel, Leaders who 
estimate coping skills, 
Positive Command 




APPENDIX F. ARMY SUICIDE PREVENTION LEADER’S 
GUIDE 
This pamphlet was provided to the researcher by the SPPM and offered to 
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